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RETALIATORY DISCHARGE, WORKERS'
COMPENSATION AND SECTION 301 PREEMPTION
LINGLE v. NORGE DIV. OF MAGIC CHEF, INC.
INTRODUCTION
Ever since Congress passed the New Deal' and post-New Deal labor acts, 2
state and federal courts have struggled to determine the preemptive effect
these federal statutes have or were meant to have on state laws affecting
labor.3 A current issue is the extent to which section 301 of the Labor-
1. The culminating piece of New Deal lAbor legislation was the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-173 (1982)).
Originally passed as a part of an effort to increase economic activity during the Depression,
Congress intended the NLRA to promote peaceful labor relations by guaranteeing employees
the right to organize and bargain collectively with their employers. Wagner Act, § 1, 49 Stat.
449 (1935). See also J. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 7 (1974)
(discussing how severe economic pressure of the Depression spurred the Roosevelt Administra-
tion and Congress into action). The NLRA, however, was not the first New Deal labor act to
guarantee the right to unionize; it was merely the successor, in permanent form, of section 7(a)
of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), § 7(a), 48 Stat. 198 (1933). S. REP. No. 573,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); H.R. REP. No. 1174, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. (1935); 79 CONG. REc.
9677 (1935). In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), the Court held
that the NIRA was an unconstitutional use of Congress' power under the commerce clause. In
NLRB v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), however, the Court began its historic
shift toward deference to the legislative branch in economic matters, and upheld the NLRA as
a constitutional exercise of Congress' commerce power. Id. at 48-49 (NLRA does not violate
employers' or employees' individual constitutional rights). See generally L. BAILLET, SURVEY OF
LABOR RELATIONS 47-49 (2d ed. 1987) (briefly summarizing ultimate constitutional validity of
the NLRA). But cf. Comment, The NLRA -Constitutional and Statutory Problems, 30 ILL. L.
REV. 884 (1936) (timely article predicting unconstitutionality of the NLRA). For a history of
pre-New Deal labor legislation and a short history of the labor movement up to the New Deal,
see A. MASON, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE LAW (1925).
2. The federal government's control of labor relations to the exclusion of the states has
steadily increased since the New Deal. See generally Smith, Preempting State Regulation of
Employment Relations: A Model for Analysis, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 35 (1985) (describing entry
of the Federal Government into employee civil rights and retirement benefits as examples). The
post-New Deal labor act pertinent to this Note is the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA),
also known as the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-
87 (1982)). The LMRA reinforces employees' rights and clarifies employers' rights in a continued
effort to encourage peaceful and productive labor relations in industries affecting interstate
commerce. Taft-Hartley Act, § 1, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). The LMRA actually amended and
incorporated the NLRA, but, for purposes of clarity, this Note will refer to all sections which
were originally part of the Wagner Act of 1935 as the NLRA and those sections which were
added by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 as the LMRA.
3. The federal labor statutes have effectively eliminated analogous state labor relations
provisions in those interstate industries where the NLRB has chosen to claim jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Amalgamated Utility Wkrs. (C.I.O.) v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940)
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Management Relations Act ("LMRA") 4 preempts state tort actions brought
(where NLRB is granted sole jurisdiction of an aspect of labor relations, it must be exclusive
forum to resolve matter). Given the broad and comprehensive definition of interstate commerce,
the NLRB has potential power over practically all employers and employees. See Santa Cruz
Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453 (1938) (local activity can be within federal control if activity has
any impact on interstate commerce). States, however, continue to have labor relations statutes
and boards that are active in areas that federal law does not regulate, such as public employees
and farming. See, e.g., Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 1601-
1627 (1985). States are also free to regulate those employers that do not meet the NLRB's
jurisdictional requirements. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1982). See generally C. KILLINGSWORTH,
STATE LABOR RELATIONS ACTS (1948) (discussing which areas of labor relations are left to the
States after passage of the LMRA).
Early preemption doctrine under the NLRA also eliminated state regulation that would cause
actual conflict with the NLRB's enforcement of federal labor regulation even though the activity
was not expressly within the NLRB's sole jurisdiction. See, e.g., Garner v. Teamsters, Local
776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) (state court precluded from issuing strike injunction because the NLRB
was vested with power to hear grievance and allowing state courts to hear the matter would
conflict with federal interest in uniform application). But cf. Rose, The Labor Management
Relations Act and the State's Power to Grant Relief, 39 VA. L. Rav. 765 (1953) (arguing that
private rights should be enforceable in state courts if matter is not expressly placed within the
NLRB's sole jurisdiction). The Supreme Court, however, expressly rejected the public versus
private right distinction in Garner, 346 U.S. at 500. Courts have also held that state laws which
curtail the employee rights to organize guaranteed by § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982),
conflict with federal law. See, e.g., Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (striking
down statute providing for state licensing of union business agents as violative of employees'
§ 7 right to choose bargaining representatives).
More extensive preemption of state regulations affecting labor began with the Supreme
Court's decision in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In
Garmon, the court held that the NLRA must preempt state regulation of activities that are
merely arguably protected or prohibited by sections 7 or 8 of the Act in order to protect the
NLRB's primary jurisdiction. Id. at 246. The Court relied on the federal interest in uniform
labor precedent as demonstrating Congress' intention to leave such matters within the exclusive
competence of the NLRB. Id. See also Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Activities,
74 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1961) (critique of Court's rationale for the Garmon rule). The expanding
preemption of state law continued to develop with new doctrines which focused on conflicts
between state controls and the administrative scheme or purpose of the federal acts. See, e.g.,
Beasly v. Food Fair, Inc., 416 U.S. 653 (1974) (NLRA § 14(a), providing that supervisors are
not entitled to same union classification as employees, preempts state law protecting supervisors'
right to join in union activity because the federal statute indicates a federal policy that supervisors
must not serve both their employer and a labor union); Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton,
377 U.S. 252 (1964) (lack of congressional regulation can preempt state regulation if state
regulation would upset balance of power between labor and management as foreseen by the
LMRA); Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (federal policy of encouraging
arbitration requires state courts to abide binding grievance decisions on the merits). Cf. Andrews
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320 (1972) (grievance arbitration system of the
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1982), must be exclusive, in part, because of its
great administrative complexity).
In the interest of federalism, the Supreme Court has regularly created exceptions to the
increasingly hostile federal preemption doctrines. As .noted in Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289 (1971): "We cannot declare pre-empted all local regulation that
touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers,
and unions; obviously, much is left to the states." Early Supreme Court cases revealed a
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by employees against their employers.5 In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 6
the Supreme Court held that section 301 will preempt a state law claim if
deference to state regulation of activity that was traditionally part of the states' police power
and which did not actually conflict with federal law. See, e.g., United Construction Workers
v. Laburnum, 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (LMRA did not preclude state court from hearing common
law tort claim even though based on an unfair labor practice).
Garmon, however, has limited exceptions to NLRA primary jurisdiction to areas of compelling
state interest or of only peripheral concern to the policies of the NLRA. Garmon, 359 U.S. at
247-48. See generally Hardy, The Preemption of State Remedies by the NLRA, 6 WAKE FoREST
L. REV. 431 (1970) (discussion of the Garmon rule and its exceptions). See also infra note 41
(discussing exceptions under Garmon). But see Recent Decisions, Federal Pre-Emption-State
Power to Exclude Ex-Felons from Union Office, 59 MIcH. L. REV. 643 (1961) (criticizing what
author viewed as too broad an exception to the Garmon rule). Moreover, an exception to
preemption will result if the court finds evidence of a specific congressional intent to leave a
matter to state control. See, e.g., Malone v. White Motor Co., 435 U.S. 497, 512-514 (1978)
(Minnesota pension fund upheld in spite of possible preemption under the balance-of-power
test where Court found specific congressional intent that states could provide additional pension
provisions for employees). See also New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor,
440 U.S. 519, 540-546 (1979) (state law altering balance of power between labor and management
not preempted because legislative histories of the NLRA and the Social Security Act demonstrate
Congress' desire that states be given freedom to regulate).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982): "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and
a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties .... "
Congress passed the statute primarily to guarantee that labor unions as well as employers would
be assessed damages for breaching collective bargaining agreements and to guarantee a forum
for such claims. See 92 CONG. REC. 662, 668, 677, 679, 684, 686, 753, 767 (1946); see also
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 462-495 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(summarizing the legislative history of § 301).
5. There are a variety of types of tort claims that a union employee may bring against an
employer. However, the employer commonly raises, with varying degrees of success, the defense
of preemption under § 301 or the NLRA. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
Hechler, 107 S. Ct. 2161 (1987) (breach of duty to provide safe workplace); Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (tortious bad faith breach of contract); Farmer v. United
Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (intentional infliction of
mental distress); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966)
(defamation); Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1987) (breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857
(9th Cir. 1987) (retaliatory discharge for reporting employer's violations of state law); Tellez
v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.) (negligent infliction of mental distress and
malicious libel), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 251 (1987); Keehr v. Consolidated Freightways of Del.,
Inc., 825 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1987) (tortious invasion of privacy); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic
Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir.), (retaliatory discharge for exercising a state right) cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987); Gibson v. AT & T Technologies, 782 F.2d 686 (7th Cir.) (fraud
perpetrated by collective bargaining agreement), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3275 (1986); Olguin v.
Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984) (retaliatory discharge for
reporting violations of federal law); Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.
1984) (wrongful discharge); Muenchow v. Parker Pen Co., 615 F. Supp. 1405 (W.D. Wis. 1985)
(misrepresentation); Bartley v. University Asphalt Co., 111 Ill. 2d 318, 489 N.E.2d 1367 (1986)
(civil conspiracy). Whether or not a tort is preempted appears to depend upon the reviewing
court rather than the particular tort at issue. See infra note 10.
6. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
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resolution of the claim is substantially dependent upon the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement. 7 The Court stated that the test adopted in
Lueck was narrow in scope' and should be applied by lower courts on a
case-by-case basis.9
Lower federal and state courts, applying Lueck's purposely narrow test,
however, have reached results that are neither uniform,10 nor, in many cases,
well reasoned." The disagreement among these courts centers primarily on
the scope of the Lueck test's preemptive power.' 2 In response to the in-
7. In Lueck, the court stated: "[W]hen the resolution of a state-law claim is substantially
dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor
contract, that claim must either be treated as a section 301 claim or dismissed as preempted by
federal labor-contract law." Id. at 220 (citations omitted).
8. Id. See generally Kinyon and Rohlik, "Deflouring" Lucas Through Labored Charac-
terizations: Tort Actions of Unionized Employees, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1 (1985) (discussing
possible effects and interpretations of the Lueck test).
9. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220.
10. Preemption of the common law tort of defamation provides a good example of the
great disparity of results and rationales under the Lueck test. In Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 817 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an
employee's defamation claim was not preempted by section 301 because the labor contract
between the parties did not specifically address the making of defamatory remarks. In Krasinski
v. United Parcel Service, 155 I1. App. 3d 831, 836, 508 N.E.2d 1105, 1110-11 (1987), an Illinois
state appellate court also held that an employee's defamation claim was not preempted by
section 301 but, unlike the Tellez court, relied on the fact that the tort was firmly rooted in
state public policy. In Green v. Hughes Aircraft Co, 630 F. Supp. 423, 426-27 (S.D. Cal. 1985),
however, a Ninth Circuit federal district court preempted a defamation claim because the
defamatory statements were central to rights and grievance procedures provided under the
collective bargaining agreement.
11. Two federal courts of appeals cases provide extreme examples of the lack of analysis
that can occur in the application of Lueck's "substantially dependent" test. In Johnson v.
Hussman, 805 F.2d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220), the court
reasoned that, "appellant's state tort claim for retaliatory discharge for filing a worker's
compensation claim has been preempted by federal labor law because resolution of that claim
is 'substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties
in a labor contract."' The Johnson court simply stated its conclusion without offering any
reason as to why resolution of the employee-plaintiff's tort action would require analysis of
the labor contract. Id. A lack of analysis, however, is not limited to cases which preempt a
tort claim. In Herring v. Prince Macaroni of New Jersey, Inc., 799 F.2d 120, 124 n.2 (3rd Cir.
1986), the court stated that a retaliatory discharge for exercising a workers' compensation rights
claim would not be preempted by section 301 because the "workers' compensation rights are
rooted in state law." As in Johnson, the Herring court did not precisely explain how it avoided
preempting the tort under the Lueck test.
12. See, e.g., Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 1987)
(would preempt state tort claims that are solely based on employment relationship); Lingle v.
Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987) (would preempt state tort action
if conduct that comprises the state action is already addressed in the labor contract); Baldracchi
v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 814 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1987) (would preempt state tort action
if it could not be resolved without referring to labor contract); Herring v. Prince Macaroni of
New Jersey, Inc., 799 F.2d 120, 124 n.2 (3rd Cir. 1986) (would not preempt claim "rooted in
state law"); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (S.D. II1. 1985)
(would preempt state tort actions whenever they "would undermine the mutually agreed upon
[Vol. 37:675
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creasing confusion below, the Supreme Court recently reviewed two federal
courts of appeals' applications of the Lueck test. 3 The Court did not,
however, address or attempt to correct the general confusion over Lueck's
preemptive effect.14
Against this background of confusion and disagreement over Lueck, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, decided Lingle v. Norge
Division of Magic Chef, Inc.'5 In Lingle, the court held that section 301
preempted Illinois' common law tort which prohibits the retaliatory dis-
charge of employees who file claims under the Illinois Workers' Compen-
sation Act.' 6 The Lingle court's decision directly conflicts with all but one
of the federal circuits that have decided the issue, as well as an Illinois
Supreme Court decision. 7
Lingle significantly curtailed union-represented employees' rights in Illi-
nois.'8 In fact, Lingle could actually penalize union employees in Illinois
because the common law workers' compensation discharge claim, with its
procedures provided for in that agreement"), aff'd, 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987); Krasinski
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 155 I11. App. 3d 831, 838, 508 N.E.2d 1105, 1110 (1987) (would
only preempt state tort actions derived from labor contracts).
13. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 107 S. Ct. 2161 (1987) (§ 301 preempted
union's duty to provide safe workplace because duty was only a contractual obligation), rev'g
772 F.2d 788 (11th Cir. 1985); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425 (1987) (9th Cir.
1986) (breach of individual employment contract claim was not completely preempted by federal
labor law and, therefore, not removable to federal court under the complete preemption
doctrine), aff'g 786 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1986).
14. Although Caterpillar did address the interplay between the Lueck test and federal
question removal jurisdiction, both Hechler and Caterpillar were case specific applications of
Lueck. In neither opinion did the Court address the general disparity of section 301 preemption
results or rationales in the lower courts. See Hechler, 107 S. Ct. at 2166; Caterpillar, 107 S.
Ct. at 2428.
15. 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987). A panel of the court did
not ever render a decision in the case. Id. at 1031.
16. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1047. See also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, 138.1-138.30 (1985) (Illinois
Workers' Compensation Act).
17. Of the three other circuits that have decided the issue only the Eighth Circuit supports
Lingle's conclusion. See Johnson v. Hussmann Corp., 805 F.2d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1986). The
Second and Third Circuits have concluded that section 301 does not preempt workers' com-
pensation discharge claims. See Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 814 F.2d 102 (2d
Cir. 1987); Herring v. Prince Macaroni of New Jersey, Inc., 799 F.2d 120, 124 n.2 (3rd Cir.
1986). The Lingle court found support for its preemption of the state tort claim in a line of
somewhat inconsistent Ninth Circuit decisions. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1049. The Ninth Circuit,
however, subsequently aligned itself with the Second and Third Circuits by holding that section
301 does not preempt the tort of wrongful discharge if it furthers an important state public
policy. Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1987). Although not a
workers' compensation discharge case, Paige adopted the public policy approach which the
Lingle court assumed the Ninth Circuit had rejected. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1049. See also Gonzalez
v. Prestress Eng'g Corp., 115 I11. 2d 1, 503 N.E.2d 308 (1986) (holding that § 301 does not
preempt Illinois workers' compensation discharge claim under Lueck), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
3248 (1987). See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 181-91 and accompanying text.
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potentially more potent remedies, remains available to non-union employ-
ees.' 9 Lingle may also strain the administration of justice within Illinois
because it conflicts with the Illinois Supreme Court's previous resolution of
this issue. 20 These potential and actual defects warrant comprehensive action
by the United States Supreme Court to resolve both the conflict within
Illinois and the more general disagreement among lower courts over the
application of the Lueck test.2
This Note will first describe the history and background of the preemption
of workers' compensation discharge claims by federal labor law. It will also
explain how the Lingle majority came to the wrong conclusion by signifi-
cantly altering the Lueck test, and how this decision will affect Illinois
employees and future section 301 preemption analysis. Finally, this Note
will suggest a refinement of the Lueck preemption test and conclude that
this refinement of Lueck would lead to more certain as well as fairer results.
I. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has articulated several preemption principles in the
context of the federal labor laws. 22 The preemption doctrines relevant to
19. The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that "lilt would be unreasonable to immunize
from punitive damages an employer who unjustly discharges a union employee, while allowing
the imposition of punitive damages against an employer who unfairly terminates a nonunion
employee." Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 IIl. 2d. 143, 150, 473 N.E.2d 1280, 1284
(1984). See also Note, Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 16 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 799, 819 (1985)
(union employees' remedy is incomplete unless punitive damages are available where state public
policy has been violated by discharge).
More generally, the United States Supreme Court has stated: "It would turn the policy that
animated the Wagner Act on its head to understand it to have penalized workers who have
chosen to join a union by preventing them from benefiting from state labor regulations imposing
minimal standards on non-union employees." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724, 756 (1985). In Metropolitan, the Court held that a state statute that mandated
minimum health care benefits in insurance policies was not preempted under the balance-of-
power preemption doctrine. Id. See infra notes 43-47 (discussing the balance-of-power test).
20. Judge Ripple, in dissent from the Lingle majority, stated that "an intermediate federal
appellate court, relying upon no explicit congressional mandate and no direct Supreme Court
precedent" has effectively frustrated an important state public policy recognized by the Illinois
Supreme Court. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1055 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
21. Prior to Lingle, Justice White wrote in dissent from the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari in Gonzalez v. Prestress Eng'g Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 1, 503 N.E.2d 308 (1986): "I would
grant the petition and resolve the conflict, rather than wait until the conflict invites more
litigation and becomes more acute." Prestress Eng'g Corp. v. Gonzalez, 107 S. Ct. 3248 (1987).
On October 13, 1987, the Supreme Court agreed with Justice White and granted Jonna Lingle's
petition for certiorari. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987).
22. Under the NLRA, a state regulation can be preempted in three different ways: (l) where
a state law curtails employee rights clearly protected by section 7, see, e.g., Hill v. Florida ex
rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (state law which interferes with federally protected § 7 rights
creates an actual conflict and is preempted by direct operation of the supremacy clause); (2)
under the Garmon rule's extensive protection of the NLRB's primary jurisdiction, see, e.g.,
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (activity that is clearly or
[Vol. 37:675
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this Note involve two of Congress' most important pieces of labor legisla-
tion: the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),23 and the Labor-Man-
agement Relations Act ("LMRA"). 24 The Supreme Court's labor preemption
doctrines derive from one of two broad grounds of state law conflict with
federal law: (1) state law conflict with the substantive rights and policies of
the federal law, or (2) state law conflict with the primary jurisdiction of
the federal enforcement agency, the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB"). 25
A. Preemption Under the NLRA
1. The NLRA preemption doctrines
Congress enacted the NLRA primarily to guarantee employees the
right to collectively bargain with their employers. 26 Section 7 of the
arguably governed by §§ 7 or 8 of the NLRA can usually only be addressed by the NLRB); or
(3) under the balance of labor v. management power test, see, e.g., Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 149 (1976) (state
regulation that alters the balance of power between labor and management as established by
federal labor law must be preempted).
Under the LMRA additions to the NLRA, preemption can occur either (1) under the balance-
of-power test, Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964), or (2) under
the substantially-dependent test, Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
Under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), preemption occurs whenever a state claim implicates
contractual grievance procedures. Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 323
(1972). The more rigid and comprehensive preemptive effect of the RLA on state law can be
explained by the administrative complexity of the act, Koehler v. Illinois Gulf Central R.R.
Co., 109 Ill. 2d 473, 488 N.E.2d 542 (1986), and by the common law's historical acceptance
of strict regulation of common carriers, see Doser v. Interstate Power Co., 173 N.W.2d 556
(Iowa 1970) (discussing history of common carriers' greater duty of care under common law).
Exceptions to RLA preemption have, nevertheless, resulted where important state policies have
been at issue. See, e.g., Stepanischen v. Merchants Dispatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 932
(1st Cir. 1983) (discharge by employer motivated by anti-union animus violates state policy
and, therefore, permits suit under state law); Puchert v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 25, 677 P.2d 449
(1984) (RLA does not preempt workers' compensation discharge claim protecting important
state right), appeal dismissed sub noma. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Puchert, 472 U.S.
1001 (1985).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982) can preempt state-law
claims under a primary jurisdiction test similar to the Garmon rule. See Wolk v. Saks Fifth
Ave., Inc., 728 F.2d 221 (3rd Cir. 1984). The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982), expressly indicates the scope of preemption Congress
meant it to have and, along with the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1982), it is a rarity among the federal statutes affecting labor
relations. The LMRDA, however, states that its provisions have no preemptive effect on
protections provided by state law. Id. For a complete discussion of the preemptive effect of all
the federal labor statutes and the various preemptive doctrines, see Smith, supra note 2.
23. Also known as the Wagner Act of 1935 §§ 1-16, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1982).
24. Also known as the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 §§ 101-503, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-67,
171-87 (1982).
25. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 895-96 (10th
ed. 1986).
26. Wagner Act, July 5, 1935, ch. 372 § 1, 49 Stat. 449, as amended 29 U.S.C. § 151
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NLRA27 guarantees employees the right to organize and bargain through
representatives of their own choosing and, as amended, the right to refrain
from such union activity. 21 Section 8 of the NLRA29 prohibits both em-
ployers and labor unions from engaging in certain enumerated unfair labor
practices.30 Preemption of state laws by the NLRA occurs in three situa-
tions: (1) where the state curtails conduct that is protected by section 7 of
the NLRA;' (2) where the state regulates conduct clearly or arguably
already protected or prohibited by sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA;32 and, (3)
where the conduct regulated by the state is not addressed by the NLRA,
but is conduct that Congress intended to leave unregulated.33 The first
(1982). In 1947, Congress amended section 1 of the Wagner Act to include employees' right
not to join labor unions as well as the right to engage in union activity. Taft-Hartley Act, June
23, 1947, ch. 120 Tit. I § 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). See also C. KLLINGSWORTH, supra note 3,
at 11-16 (1948) (discussing aspects of the LMRA that began to regulate unions more closely
and their influence on state law).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
28. Section 7 provides:
Employees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all such activities ....
Id. See L. BAILLET, supra note 1; P. SMITH, REDEEMING TiE TIME, 446-60 (1987) (background
of original legislative right to unionize and its political and social implications).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
30. Id. Section (a) of the act sets forth unfair labor practices as applied to management.
Id. § 158(a). Section (b) sets out unfair labor practices as applied to unions. Id. § 158(b).
31. See Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 528 (1945). See also infra notes 34-36 and
accompanying text.
32. Where the activity is expressly within the NLRB's sole subject matter jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court has held that they must be preempted because actual conflict would result from
either state or federal courts hearing such claims at the trial level. Amalgamated Utility Workers
(C.I.O.) v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261 (1940). See also Garner v. Teamsters, Local
776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) (precluding state court from issuing strike injunction because the
NLRB had power to hear matter and uniformity of such precedent had to prevail); supra notes
3, 26.
In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), the Court extended the
primary jurisdiction NLRA preemption doctrine to arguably protected or prohibited conduct,
and further developed the doctrine in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 197 (1978) (distinguishing between arguably protected and arguably
prohibited conduct for purposes of analysis and holding that arguably prohibited conduct is
entitled to less protection). See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
33. The balance-of-power test was established in Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton,
377 U.S. 252 (1964), as a preemption doctrine under LMRA section 303. The balance-of-power
test is derived from language in section 1 of the NLRA stating that "it is the policy of the act
to establish an equality of bargaining power between employer and employees." 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1982). In Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976) the Court revived and extended the balance-of-power test
under the NLRA and stated that Congress intended certain forms of economic pressure to
remain unregulated because they were left "to be controlled by the free play of economic
forces." See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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type of preemption is exemplified by Brown v. Hotel and Restaurant Em-
ployees and Bartenders,34 where the Supreme Court reminded lower courts
that, if a state law interferes with conduct that is expressly protected by
federal law, preemption follows as a matter of substantive right.35 The state's
interest in the regulation is irrelevant to this first type of preemption under
the NLRA.3
6
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon 7 clarified and extended a
second, and broader, type of NLRA preemption that protects the NLRB's
primary jurisdiction.38 The Garmon rule mandates deference by the state to
the NLRB when an activity is clearly or arguably regulated by section 7 or
section 8 of the NLRA.3 9 The Garmon analysis, however, differs from the
first, substantive type of NLRA preemption in that the state's interest in
local control will be weighed against the federal interest in a uniform labor
systemA° An exception to Garmon preemption results if the state regulation
34. 468 U.S. 491 (1984).
35. Id. at 501. See also Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 239-40 (1967)
(invalidating state unemployment compensation law because it infringed on conduct expressly
protected by § 7); Bus Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74, 81-82 (1963) (striking down statute
prohibiting peaceful strikes against utilities); Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454,
458-59 (1950) (invalidating state "strike-vote" regulations).
36. Balancing is inappropriate because the supremacy clause of the United States Consti-
tution, Art. VI, § 1, mandates preemption of state laws that actually conflict with federal
legislation. Brown, 468 U.S. at 500. See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962).
37. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
38. In Garmon, the Supreme Court established the Garmon rule, and thereby expanded the
NLRA's primary jurisdiction preemption doctrine. The Court stated: "In the absence of the
Board's clear determination that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited or of compelling
precedent applied to essentially undisputed facts, it is not for this court to decide whether such
activities are subject to state jurisdiction." Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246. The Court continued:
"The governing consideration is that to allow the States to control activities that are potentially
subject to federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict with national labor policy."
Id. See generally Michelman, supra note 3 (early interpretation and criticism of the Garmon
rule and its broadened preemptive effect). For a more current analysis approving of the Garmon
rule and discouraging any limitation of its preemptive effect, see Come, Federal Application
of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application of Garmon, 56 VA. L.
REv. 1435 (1970).
39. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246. The deference shown to the NLRB by the Garmon Court
grew out of the Board's unique role as the prime arbiter of labor disputes under the NLRA.
The Supreme Court's NLRA preemption doctrines, and in particular the Garmon rule, preserve
the NLRB's effectiveness by preventing encroachments on its jurisdiction. For a good back-
ground on the NLRB, its importance to Congress' control of federal labor law and this topic
generally, see J. GRoss, supra note 1.
40. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44. Because balancing is only appropriate in primary juris-
diction preemption it is important to distinguish this doctrine, based on agency expertise, from
preemption that results when a state law curtails a section 7 right. Brown v. Hotel and Restaurant
Employees and Bartenders, 468 U.S. 491, 502-504 (1984). Of this important distinction, however,
the Supreme Court has stated that "in referring to decisions holding state laws preempted by
the NLRA, care must be taken to distinguish preemption based on the federal protection of
the conduct in question . .. from that based predominantly on the primary jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board . . . , although the two are often not easily separable."
Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 n.19 (1969).
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is deeply rooted in local law or if the regulation is of only peripheral concern
to federal labor policy.4
The third preemption doctrine, which is not limited to the NLRA, allows
a court to preempt a state regulation of conduct which has not been addressed
by federal law if Congress' silence on the matter reflects an intention that
the activity remain unregulated.4 2 In Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton,43
the Supreme Court stated that the key to determining Congress' intent was
through a balance-of-power inquiry. 4 If the state regulation threatened to
upset the balaqce-of-power between labor and management as expressed in
national labor policy, preemption would be appropriate. 4 The balance-of-
41. The Supreme Court has used a balancing test to carve exceptions out of the Garmon
rule for state regulations that were deeply rooted in local law or of only peripheral concern to
federal labor policies. See, e.g., Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. Local
25, 430 U.S. 290, 305 (1977) (intentional infliction of mental distress claim excepted from the
Garmon rule if conduct is truly outrageous); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am.,
Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 54 (1966) (defamation claim by employer against union excepted from
the Garmon rule); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (state power to exclude felons
from union office not preempted by Garmon). A number of lower court cases, however, have
distinguished "personal torts" from "business torts," often finding actions under the latter
category to be preempted. See, e.g., Mobile Mechanical Ass'n v. Carlough, 664 F.2d 481, 487
(5th Cir. 1981) (preempting suit for tortious interference with economic advantage); Palm Beach
Co. v. Journeymen's Union, Local 157, 519 F. Supp. 705, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that
"business torts do not raise significant enough state concerns for the state tort law to survive
preemption"). For a discussion of the categories of activities that have been excepted from
Garmon, see Smith, supra note 2, at 46-50.
42. The NLRA "balance of power" test, enunciated in Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976), proscribes state
regulations and causes of action which Congress intended to remain unprotected. The inquiry
focuses on whether the state action impermissibly upsets the balance of power between labor
and management by interfering with the role served by the free play of economic forces. Id.
at 149-150.
43. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
44. Id. at 260. Morton, while not an NLRA case, established the balancing test principle
under section 303 of the LMRA, and held that state-imposed liability on a union engaged in a
legal strike "upsetfs] the balance of power between labor and management expressed in our
national labor policy." Id. See also Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA.
L. REV. 1 (1940) (congressional negative will be presumed where unreasonable interference with
national interests would result). The Supreme Court adopted the Dowling test in 1945 for
purposes of determining preemption of state law under the dormant commerce clause. Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). Although the analogy drawn from the Dowling
test to the NLRA/LMRA balance-of-power test is not complete, the example is helpful in
understanding the Supreme Court's approach to Congress' silence on a topic having a preemptive
effect on state law. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963) (dictum).
45. Morton, 377 U.S. at 260. See Machinists, 427 U.S. at 150. In New York Tel. Co. v.
New York Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 533-40 (1979), a plurality of the Court attempted to
narrow the applicability of the balance-of-power test. The Court upheld a state unemployment
compensation statute authorizing the payment of benefits to strikers with the primary financial
burden falling on the employer. Id. at 523-24. Three justices reasoned, in part, that the balance-
of-power doctrine was not as applicable where the state law was one of general applicability
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power preemption doctrine focuses on actual conflict. This doctrine is based
on a substantive right, and is not based on any deference to the primary
jurisdiction of the NLRB. 46 An exception to preemption may result if the
court finds that Congress did not intend to preempt a particular state
regulation .47
2. NLRA preemption of workers' compensation discharge claims
In Peabody Galion v. Dollar,48 one of the first cases to analyze the effect
of federal labor law on workers' compensation discharge claims, 49 the em-
rather than specifically directed at the union-management relationship in spite of its effect. Id.
at 533-35. While it is not clear just how the present Court views this general applicability
limitation, the two balance-of-power challenges to state laws subsequent to New York Tel. did
not result in preemption. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985)
(upholding mandatory minimum health-care benefits in employee benefit insurance policies);
Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983) (upholding breach-of-contract and misrepresentation
claims brought against employer by replacement workers who had been displaced by returning
strikers despite previous assurances). For examples of lower court applications of the balance-
of-power test, see Gould, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 750
F.2d 608, 611 (7th Cir. 1984) (state statute prohibiting state agencies from doing business for
three years with employers who were guilty of NLRA violations was preempted as impermissible
interference with federal scheme); Massachusetts Nurses Ass'n v. Dukakis, 570 F. Supp. 628,
640 (D. Mass. 1983) (upholding state statute aimed at reducing hospital costs which established
limitations on wage increases), aff'd, 726 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1984); Golden State Transit Corp.
v. City of Los Angeles, 520 F. Supp. 191, 193-94 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (enjoining City of Los
Angeles from allowing plaintiff's taxicab franchise to expire while plaintiff was embroiled in
labor dispute with its drivers), vacated, 686 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1105 (1983).
46. Belknap, 463 U.S. at 498-99; New York Tel., 440 U.S. at 527-33; Machinists, 427 U.S.
at 138-41. See generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HAv. L. REv. 1337 (1972)
(distinguishing basis of substantive and primary jurisdiction preemption and proposing broader
use of the substantive balance-of-power test).
47. Because Congress did not specifically designate the preemptive effect of the NLRA/
LMRA, see supra note 22, the Court's preemption doctrines are necessary (1) to infer Congress'
intent to preempt conflicting state laws under the supremacy clause and (2) to determine which
state laws conflict. The ultimate justification for preemption under the supremacy clause,
however, remains congressional intent and, accordingly, specific evidence of Congress' desire
to leave a matter to state regulation must override the applicable preemption doctrine. See,
e.g., Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (upholding pension fund statute
potentially altering the balance of power between labor and management because Court found
evidence that Congress intended states to be free to regulate in the area).
48. 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981).
49. Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 I11. App. 3d 402, 407 N.E.2d 95 (1980), apparently
is the only case addressing preemption of a workers' compensation discharge claim prior to
Peabody. In Cook, the plaintiff grieved a discharge for absences following a compensation
award, but did not raise a claim of retaliation. An arbitrator found just cause for the termination.
When the employee subsequently filed a suit in tort for retaliatory discharge, the appellate
court ordered the case dismissed because a collective bargaining agreement "is an effort to
erect a system of industrial self government." Id. at 405, 407 N.E.2d at 98. Contra Wyatt v.
Jewel Co., 108 111. App. 3d 840, 439 N.E.2d 1053 (1982) (union employee not precluded from
filing workers' compensation discharge claim).
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ployer argued that the NLRA preempted an Oklahoma statute. As it applied
to union employees, the statute created a tort cause of action for employees
who had been discharged in retaliation for filing workers' compensation
claims.5 0 The Peabody court applied each of the relevant NLRA preemption
doctrines5 and first found that the NLRA did not expressly address the
employee's claim.5 2 Next, the court found the Garmon rule inapplicable
because wrongful discharge in the workers' compensation context could not
even arguably be characterized as an unfair labor practice prohibited by
section 8 of the NLRA.53 Alternatively, the Peabody court pointed out that,
even if the Garmon rule were applicable, the workers' compensation dis-
charge claim would fall within the class of exceptions to the rule because
retaliatory discharge torts not related to union activity were only peripherally
related to the policies of the NLRA.5 4 The Peabody court also concluded
that the balance-of-power preemption doctrine was inapplicable.55 The court
reasoned that the claim would not upset the balance of power between labor
and management because it could not be classified an "essential aspect of
the economic forces which enter into the shaping of viable labor agree-
ments."
5 6
Peabody's comprehensive NLRA preemption analysis was accepted in the
few cases that subsequently addressed the issue in the context of workers'
compensation discharge claims.57 After Peabody, however, employers shifted
the preemption analysis away from the NLRA and began to argue that
section 301 of the LMRA preempted state retaliatory and wrongful discharge
50. Peabody, 666 F.2d at 1313 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, §§ 5-7 (1981)).
51. NLRA preemption of state laws which curtail employees' section 7 rights was inapplicable
in this context. The employer argued primary jurisdiction and balance-of-power preemption
because employers have no rights under section 7.
52. Id. at 1316. The "clearly prohibited" aspect of primary jurisdiction preemption did not
apply, because, although sections 8(a)(3) and (a)(4) prohibit employers from discharging em-
ployees for exercising their section 7 rights to unionize and collectively bargain, it does not
address discharge in any other context. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1982).
53. Peabody, 666 F.2d at 1316. The court reasoned that the NLRB could not have analyzed
the retaliatory discharge claim as an unfair labor practice because the filing of a workers'
compensation claim could not even arguably be characterized as union activity. Id. The NLRB
subsequently held that an individual who files a workers' compensation claim has not engaged
in activity protected by section 7. Central Georgia Elec. Membership Corp., 269 N.L.R.B. 635
(1984).
54. Peabody, 666 F.2d at 1316. For some representative cases, see supra note 41.
55. Peabody, 666 F.2d at 1318.
56. Id. at 1316. The Peabody court also relied on the fact that the law was one of "general
applicability" and not merely aimed at union employment relationships. Id. at 1317. See also
New York Tel. Co., 440 U.S. at 533 (Court has "consistently recognized that a congressional
intent to deprive the States of their power to enforce such general laws is more difficult to
infer than an intent to preempt laws directed specifically at concerted activity").
57. See Dority v. Green Country Castings Corp. 727 P.2d 1355, 1359 (Okl. 1986) (NLRA
did not preempt Oklahoma's statutory workers' compensation discharge claim, citing Peabody
with approval). Accord Taylor v. Tsekeris, 163 Ill. App. 3d 195, 516 N.E.2d 562 (1987).
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claims. 8 The current controversy over workers' compensation discharge
claims has ripened under the section 301 preemption doctrine. 9
B. Preemption Under Section 301 of the LMRA
1. Section 301 preemption prior to Lueck
Section 301 of the LMRA 6° expressly grants the federal courts jurisdiction
over suits involving the breach of collective bargaining agreements. The
Supreme Court, in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,6 held that Congress
also intended the federal courts to create a body of federal common law to
be used in section 301 suits. 62
In 1962, the Supreme Court decided Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,63
and Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 64 two key cases in section 301's
development. In Charles Dowd, the Court held that while state courts have
58. The Supreme Court's decision in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985),
prompted employers to use section 301 to preempt tort claims brought against them by their
employees because the Court specifically held that section 301 could preempt state tort claims.
For an example of how, within weeks of the Lueck decision, it was being cited and argued in
cases where section 301 preemption was not even at issue, see Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg.
Co., 762 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1985). After Lueck, the digests filled with caselaw involving section
301 preemption of employee tort claims where employers cited to Lueck as a matter of course.
See supra note 12 (citing some representative cases).
59. See generally Comment, Midgett v. Sackett in the Aftermath of Allis-Chalmers: The
Impact of Federal Labor Law on Retaliatory Discharge Claims, 6 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 347 (1986)
[hereinafter Comment, Midgett v. Sackett] (discussing impact of Lueck on Illinois' workers'
compensation discharge claims as applied to union employees and predicting preemption because
of federal policy favoring arbitration of individual employee grievances). Accord Kinyon and
Rohlik, supra note 8, at 63.
60. Section 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982) provides: "Suits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties ......
61. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
62. Id. at 456-57. The issue in Textile Workers was whether a federal court hearing a section
301 claim could fashion a remedy based only on federal labor law, or whether it was bound
by the remedy offered by the relevant state contract law principle. The Court held that state
law should not bind a federal court in section 301 claims, and upheld the injunction ordered
by the lower court as proper under the federal section 301 common law enunciated in the case.
Id. at 457. Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, thought the majority had transformed a "plainly
procedural section ... into a mandate to the federal courts to fashion a whole body of
substantive federal law appropriate for the complicated and touchy problems raised by collective
bargaining." Id. at 461 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter further stated that the
majority had incorrectly relied on a few isolated statements in the legislative history to support
its conclusion. Id. at 462.
63. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
64. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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concurrent jurisdiction over section 301 claims, they must apply the federal
common law developed by Textile Workers and its progeny. 65 The Lucas
Flour Court added that Congress intended this body of federal common
law, as foreseen in Textile Workers, to prevail over inconsistent local rules. 66
The Court concluded that an employee could not bring a breach of labor
contract claim under state contract law and thereby avoid section 301. Claims
arising out of bargaining contracts had to be brought under section 301 and
resolved by reference to section 301 federal common law. 67
Lucas Flour resolved only section 301 preemption as applied to state
contract law. 61 It did not resolve whether an employee could avoid bringing
a section 301 claim by couching the same facts as a state tort claim. 69
65. 368 U.S. at 514. The Court's conclusion that section 301 permitted concurrent jurisdic-
tion of state and federal courts went against some strong dicta in earlier cases stating that
section 301 vested jurisdiction exclusively in federal courts because only federal courts are
mentioned in the statute. Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
210 F.2d 623, 625 (3rd Cir. 1954), aff'd, 348 U.S. 437 (1955); International Plainfield Motor
Co. v. Local 343, 123 F. Supp. 683, 691 (D.N.J. 1954).
Another important jurisdictional issue arose as to whether the Garmon rule could preempt a
section 301 claim in favor of the NLRB's primary jurisdiction if the breach of the labor contract
alleged in the section 301 claim constituted an arguably unfair labor practice. In Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 201 (1962), the Court held that the Garmon rule was
inapplicable to section 301 claims. See also Note, Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, Garmon Rule
of Pre-emption of State Court Jurisdiction Over Unfair Labor Practices Held Inapplicable in
Suits Under Section 310 of the National Labor Relations Act, 31 FORDHAM L. REv. 829 (1963)
(approving of Smith). Nevertheless, lower court decisions have held that if the pivotal issue in
a section 301 claim involves a matter that expressly falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Board, the claim will be preempted by the NLRA. Baker v. Newspaper & Graphic Communi-
cations Local 6, 628 F.2d 156, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1980); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Textile
Workers Union, 559 F.2d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 1977); Local 17, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Coast
Cartage Co., 103 L.R.R.M. 3053, 3054 (D. Colo. 1980). See generally Feldesman, Section 301
and the National Labor Relations Act, 30 TENN. L. RV. 16, 18 (1966) (discussing jurisdictional
interplay between statutes).
66. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103-04.
67. Id. The lower court, the Washington Supreme Court, accepted jurisdiction of a section
301 claim but resolved the claim using state contract law. The Supreme Court held that this
use of state law was error but did not reverse because the result reached was consistent with
federal law. Id. at 105.
68. See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, 376 F.2d 337, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1967) ("after Lucas Flour, state law does not exist to
enforce collective bargaining agreements"), aff'd, 390 U.S. 557, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 929
(1968).
69. Pre-Lueck section 301 preemption focused on state claims that were merely contract
derivative tort actions. The courts focused on whether the tort actually "sounded in contract"
as a breach of a collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Buscemi v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 736 F.2d 1348, 1350-51 (9th Cir. 1984) (plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim was thinly-
disguised attempt to circumvent collective bargaining agreement grievance procedures). Accord
Oglesby v. RCA Corp., 752 F.2d 272, 275-76 (7th Cir. 1985); Olguin v. Inspiration Consol.
Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Fristoe v. Reynolds Metal Co.,
615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1980) (state claim alleging common law wrongful discharge in
violation of labor contract and union's breach of fiduciary duty must be brought as section
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Ultimately, lower courts were forced to decide this unresolved issue because
employers began to allege that section 301 preempted state tort, as well as
state contract actions. 0
Employers offered two reasons why section 301 should be given broader
preemptive power. First the legal boundaries of NLRA preemption were
fairly settled by the 1980's, making extension of its preemptive scope un-
likely. 71 Second, some states were expanding the rights extended to employees
through both old and new tort actions. 72 Some of the newer torts, such as
retaliatory discharge, were initially only available to non-union employees,
and, therefore, were no threat to union employers' interests. 73 When some
states extended the coverage of retaliatory discharge claims to union em-
ployees, however, employers feared that the limited remedies and arbitration
bargained for in labor contracts would be easily avoided by employees eager
to obtain larger awards in state courts. 74 As a result, employers argued that
section 301 preempted varied state tort actions as applied to union employees
on the ground that they were nothing more than contract claims masquer-
ading as torts. The Supreme Court first addressed the circumstances under
which section 301 could preempt a state tort action in Allis-Chalmers Corp.
v. Lueck. 71
301 claim). These courts did not discuss, nor had it been argued, whether section 301 could be
used to preempt tort actions. It was not until Lueck that the Supreme Court held that section
301 could preempt a non-contractual cause of action or state law. See infra notes 75-89 and
accompanying text.
70. See brief for petitioner at 13-18, Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985)
(No. 83-1748) (arguing that section 301 must preempt more than state contract actions by union
employees because Lucas Flour did not limit itself to preemption of inconsistent state contract
law and most circuits did not either).
71. See generally Taldone, Federal Preemption of Wrongful Discharge Claims of Union
Employees, 12 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 33, 34 (1986); Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor
Law Preemption, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 277, 281-83 (1980) (discussing unlikely extension of Garmon
to new areas in light of recent Supreme Court precedent). The Garmon rule had only rarely
been applied to personal tort claims which were usually excepted from Garmon in deference to
the high state interest in them. See supra, note 41. See generally Smith, supra note 2, at 45-50
(1985) (discussing exceptions from the Garmon rule).
72. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980) (recognizing retaliatory discharge claim as violative of public policy); Kelsay
v. Motorola, 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1983) (same). For a state-by-state survey of
common law wrongful discharge decisions, see 1984 Report of the Employment-at-Will Sub-
committee, Employment and Labor Relations Committee, A.B.A. LITIGATION SEc. (1985)
[hereinafter A.B.A. 1984 Report].
73. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, 74 Il. 2d 172, 176, 384 N.E.2d 353, 355 (1978) (providing
that new Illinois tort of retaliatory discharge would only apply to at-will employees). See also
ABA 1984 REPORT, supra note 72.
74. See Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984) (Moran, J.,
dissenting). See generally Comment, Midgett v. Sackett, supra note 59 (discussing added expense
of defending tort claims instead of grievances and their unpredictability).
75. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
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2. The Lueck preemption test
In Lueck, the Supreme Court held that the labor policies articulated in
Lucas Flour required Section 301's preemptive effect to extend beyond state
suits alleging contract violations. 76 The Lueck Court was faced with an
employee who brought a tortious bad-faith breach-of-contract claim in state
court instead of pursuant to procedures required by his collective bargaining
agreement. The employee claimed that the employer had in bad faith breached
its contractual duty to provide certain insurance coverage. 77 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court had held that section 301 did not preempt the tort because
it was distinct from the ordinary bad-faith breach-of-contract claim that
would have been preempted under Lucas Flour.71
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court
and held that section 301 preempted the bad-faith tort claim. 79 The Court
first held that, while a state's characterization of its own tort action is a
question of state law, preemption under section 301 is a question of federal
law. 0 The Court further stated that virtually any contract claim can be cast
as a tort claim, and that to allow such a technical distinction would injure
federal labor policy.8" The Court then established a test to determine whether
76. Id. at 210. In particular, the Court cited the federal policy of encouraging arbitration
and discouraging litigation as a means of resolving labor disputes. Teamsters Local 174 v.
Lucas F16ur Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1962). The Supreme Court's "Steelworker's Trilogy"
affirmed that federal policy favors grievance and arbitration mechanisms as the exclusive remedy
for contractual wrongful discharge claims. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564, 569 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warriors and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
585 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
The grievance and arbitration procedure may be bypassed and a section 301 suit brought,
however, when the union breaches its duty of fair representation. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,
177 (1967). See also D'Amato v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 760 F.2d 1474, 1488 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing
further exceptions, i.e., (1) where the employer repudiates the contract; (2) where grievance
would be futile; and (3) where the union has been relieved of its obligation).
77. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 206. The labor contract provided a non-occupational disability
insurance plan for all employees. Id. at 204.
78. Id. at 207; Lueck v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 2d 559, 566, 342 N.W.2d 699, 702-
03 (1984). The Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned that a section 301 suit arose out of a
violation of a labor contract, and that the employee's claim was a tort claim involving bad
faith. Under Wisconsin law, the tort of bad faith is distinguishable from a bad-faith breach-
of-contract claim-though a breach of duty exists as a consequence of the relationship established
by contract, it is independent of that contract. Therefore, the Wisconsin Court stated the
violation of the labor contract was "irrelevant to the issue of whether the [employer] had
exercised bad faith in the manner in which they [sic] handled Lueck's claim." Accordingly, the
state court did not view the action as a section 301 suit. Id. at 566, 342 N.W.2d at 703.
79. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220-21.
80. Id. at 210.
81. Id. at 211. The court stated:
Were state law allowed to determine the meaning intended by the parties in adopting
a particular contract phrase or term, all the evils addressed in Lucas Flour would
recur. The parties would be uncertain as to what they were binding themselves to
when they agreed to create a right to collect benefits under certain circumstances.
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a state tort action should be preempted. Under the Lueck test, a state claim
will be preempted when its resolution is substantially dependent upon an
analysis of the parties' collective bargaining agreement.82 The Lueck Court
concluded that section 301 preempted the bad-faith tort because the em-
ployee's right to insurance coverage only existed as a result of the fact that
his union contract provided for such insurance.8 3
Although Lueck expanded the preemptive effect of section 301, the Court
was also concerned about possibly over-broad applications of the test it had
established.14 The Court stated that not every state-law suit asserting a right
that relates in some way to a provision in a collective bargaining agreement
is necessarily preempted by section 301.85 The Court added that it passed no
judgment on whether a non-negotiable, state-imposed duty that did not
create similar problems of contract interpretation would be preempted under
similar circumstances. The Lueck Court concluded that its test should be
applied on a case-by-case basis, always comparing the state cause of action
to the labor contract in question.8 7
After Lueck, it was clear that section 301 would preempt state claims that
could not have been brought without the existence of the labor contract.88
Where, however, a state cause of action specifically protected a guaranteed
non-negotiable state right, the limiting language in Lueck seemed to indicate
that such a claim would not be preempted.89 Just how broadly or narrowly
lower courts would construe Lueck's preemptive scope was difficult to predict
As a result, it would be more difficult to reach agreement, and disputes as to the
nature of the agreement would proliferate. Exclusion of such claims 'from the
ambit of § 301 would stultify the congressional policy of having the administration
of collective bargaining agreements accomplished under a uniform body of federal
substantive law.'
Id. (quoting Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962)).
82. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220-21. Earlier in the opinion, the Court phrased the preemption
test as whether evaluation of the tort claim is "inextricably intertwined with consideration of
the terms of the labor contract" and "if the state law purports to define the meaning of the
contractual relationship, that law is pre-empted." Id. at 213.
83. Id. at 218-19.
84. Id. at 220.
85. Id. at 211. As an illustration the court stated, "Clearly, § 301 does not grant the parties
to a collective bargaining agreement the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law."
Id. at 212.
86. Id. at 212 n.6.
87. Id. at 220.
88. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers. v. Hechler, 107 S. Ct. 2161 (1987) (common
law claim of breach of duty to provide employees with a safe workplace would be preempted
under § 301 and Lueck where labor union only had legal duty to provide its members with safe
workplace because of labor contract).
89. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2431 (1987) (mere fact that employee
could have brought suit under § 301 for violation of labor contract did not preclude employee
from alleging that same conduct gave rise to breach of an individual employment contract
under state law because such claim was independent of labor contract). See Taldone, supra
note 71, at 40.
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because language in the opinion could be used to support either possibility. 9°
3. Workers' compensation discharge claims and section 301 preemption
in Illinois prior to Lingle
Illinois recognized workers' compensation discharge claims in 1978.11 In-
itially, workers' compensation discharge claims were only available to non-
union employees. 92 Then, in Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 93 the Illinois
Supreme Court extended the tort's protection to unionized employees covered
by collective bargaining agreements.Y Midgett preceded Lueck, however, so
it remained to be seen how the Illinois Supreme Court would analyze an
employer's allegation that section 301 preempted workers' compensation
discharge claims as applied to union employees. 95
In Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp., 96 the Illinois Supreme Court
directly faced the preemption issue.97 The Gonzalez court concluded that
workers' compensation discharge claims by union employees were not pre-
empted in spite of the fact that the court had preempted similar state claims
just prior to Gonzalez.9 The court relied on the important state interest
90. Compare Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 814 F.2d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 1987)
(preemption only results when labor contract must be referred to when resolving state claim;
focusing on the Lueck test language and the limits of § 301 preemption as set forth in opinion)
with Lingle v. Norge. Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (S.D. I11. 1985)
(preemption results whenever a state-law claim "would undermine the mutually agreed upon
procedures provided for in that agreement"; focusing on federal labor policies served by § 301
Lueck preemption). See also supra note 14. See generally Kinyon and Rohlik, supra note 8, at
38-45 (discussing ambiguities, possible effects and interpretations of Lueck and its preemption
test).
91. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). In Kelsay, the court
held that the important state policy interest in protecting the right to workers' compensation
as granted by the legislature required that at-will employees be able to recover damages from
employers who discharge them solely for exercising their right. Id. at 175, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
92. Id. at 174, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
93. 105 111. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984).
94. Id. at 150, 473 N.E.2d at 1283-84. The court stated it would be unfair to allow non-
union employees to recover punitive damages in workers' compensation discharge claims while
limiting union employees to their contractual remedies. Id. See supra note 19 and accompanying
text.
95. The section 301 preemption issue was not before the Midgett court because Lueck had
not yet been decided and the employer did not raise it. Midgett, 105 I11. 2d at 150, 473 N.E.2d
at 1285.
96. 115 Ill. 2d i, 503 N.E.2d 308 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3428 (1987).
97. Id. Gonzalez was originally a companion case to Midgett and, on remand, the employer
argued that even though the worker's compensation discharge claim was now available in Illinois
to union employees, section 301 preempted the claim under the Lueck test. Id.
98. In Koehler v. Illinois Gulf Central R.R. Co., 109 II1. 2d 473, 488 N.E.2d 542 (1985),
aff'd, 463 N.E.2d 918, cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 3297 (1986), the court held that the Railway
Labor Act preempted a retaliatory discharge claim. In Bartley v. University Asphalt Co., Ill
I11. 2d 318, 489 N.E.2d 1367 (1986), the court applied the Lueck test and held that section 301
preempted an employee's claim alleging his union civilly conspired with his employer. One
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served by the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act and that the right to
workers' compensation is non-negotiable and not affected by collective
bargaining." The Gonzalez court reasoned that a state cause of action based
on such a non-negotiable right is independent of any contract provision and
must, therefore, fall within one of the exceptions to preemption foreseen by
Lueck.c0
In contrast to the agreement among Illinois state courts, the Seventh
Circuit's federal district courts sharply disagreed over section 301's preemp-
tive effect on workers' compensation discharge claims. Shortly after Lueck,
in Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co.,'0 ' the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the Indiana Supreme Court would not extend Indiana's workers'
compensation discharge tort to employees covered by collective bargaining
agreements if presented with the issue. 0 2 The* Vantine court found Indiana's
workers' compensation law to be rooted in contract and, therefore, a claim
under it could not be independent of the labor contract. 03 The court's
decision, while indicative of the way it would view a workers' compensation
discharge claim in Illinois, did not bind the federal district courts applying
Illinois law.'°0 In addition, preemption was not actually at issue in Vantine-
the court only used preemption in its analysis of whether to extend the tort's
labor commentator interpreted Koehler and Bartley to effectively overrule Midgett, and thought
it virtually certain that the Illinois Supreme Court, in Gonzalez, would preempt the workers'
compensation discharge claim. See Henry, Retaliatory Discharge: Status of the Tort in Illinois,
LAB. L.J. 146, 154-55 (March 1987).
99. Gonzalez, 115 111. 2d at 9-13, 503 N.E.2d at 311-13.
100. Id. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. Gonzalez made it clear that section
301 did not preempt workers' compensation discharge claims in Illinois. Byrd v. Aetna Casualty
and Surety Co. 152 I11. App. 3d 292, 298, 504 N.E.2d 216, 221 (1987). Accord Taylor v.
Tsekeris, 163 I11. App. 3d 195, 516 N.E.2d 562 (1987). Moreover, after Gonzalez, two Illinois
appellate courts held that section 301 does not preempt any state causes of action that are
based on important state public policies. Richardson v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 156 I11. App. 3d
1006, 1009, 510 N.E.2d 134, 136 (1987) (any state tort action designed to protect the public
exists separate and apart from rights created by labor contract); Krasinski v. United Parcel
Service, 155 I11. App. 3d. 831, 840, 508 N.E.2d 1105, 1110 (1987) (any state tort action "firmly
rooted" in public policy is not preempted under the Lueck test). Other states which have
addressed the issue under Lueck also have not preempted the tort claim. Bonner v. Fleming
Companies, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); MGM Grand Hotel-Reno, Inc. v.
Insley, 728 P.2d 821 (Nev. 1986).
101. 762 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1985).
102. Id. at 517. The issue was before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals under diversity
jurisdiction and involved the interpretation of state law. Id. at 516.
103. Id. at 517. This "rooted-in-contract" analysis is analogous to the pre-Lueck test for
section 301 preemption, i.e., if the state claim "sounds in contract", it must be brought under
federal law as a section 301 claim because it is not actually a tort claim at all. See supra note
69.
104. See Waycaster v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 1052, 1058 (N.D. I11. 1986)
(recognizing that Vantine was not binding precedent in Illinois federal district courts), aff'd,
823 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1987).
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coverage to union employees.' 5 In fact, after Vantine, the majority of Illinois
federal district courts held that section 301 did not preempt Illinois' workers'
compensation discharge tort.'°6
4. Section 301 preemption of workers' compensation discharge claims in
the other Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals
Prior to Lingle, three other Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals had ad-
dressed the effect of Lueck on workers' compensation discharge claims. In
Herring v. Prince Macaroni of New Jersey, Inc., 07 the Third Circuit ad-
dressed the issue while deciding whether New Jersey state courts would
extend the tort to union employees. The Herring court held that the New
Jersey Supreme Court would extend the tort's coverage and,108 in dicta,
further stated that section 301 would not preempt such claims.' °9 The court
emphasized the language in Lueck which limited the preemptive effect of
section 301,110 but did not actually apply the Lueck test.'
105. The Vantine court never reached the federal preemption issue because the court held
that the Indiana Supreme Court would not elect to extend its workers' compensation discharge
tort to union employees. Vantine, 762 F.2d at 517. Any comments made on the topic, therefore,
were dicta. Byrd v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 152 Ill. App. 3d 292, 298, 504 N.E.2d 216,
221 (1987).
106. See La Buhn v. Bulkmatic Transport Co., 644 F. Supp. 942, 949 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (no
preemption); Orsini v. Echlin, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 38, 42 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (same); Daugherty v.
Lucky Stores, Inc. 603 F. Supp. 975, 978 (C.D. 11. 1985) (same). Contra Waycaster v. AT &
T Technologies, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 1052, 1058 (N.D. I11. 1986) (preemption), aff'd, 822 F.2d
1091 (7th Cir. 1987); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (S.D.
I11. 1985) (same). Furthermore, the Illinois federal district courts applied Lueck independently
of the Vantine decision, with the La Buhn court openly criticizing Vantine. La Buhn, 644 F.
Supp. at 650-51. For federal district court resolution of the workers' compensation discharge
claim issue outside the Seventh Circuit, see Tombley v. Ford Motor Co., 666 F. Supp. 972
(E.D. Mich. 1987) (declining to preempt workers' compensation discharge claim under § 301
because public policy and civil rights protections of state law confer non-negotiable state rights
and exist indepen,dently of private agreements); Sutton v. Southwest Forest Industries, 643 F.
Supp. 662 (D. Kan. 1986) (declining to preempt workers' compensation discharge claim under
§ 301 because action is independent of labor contract); Benton v. Kroger Co., 635 F. Supp.
56, 58 n.l (S.D. Tex. 1986) (declining to preempt workers' compensation discharge claim under
§ 301 because action does not interfere with union organization or collective bargaining and
does not tend to conflict with federal labor law). Accord Smith v. Capital Mfg. Co., 626 F.
Supp. 110, 112-13 (S.D. Ohio 1985). Contra Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., 664 F. Supp. 290,
292-93 (E.D. Tenn. 1987); Edwards v. Western Mfg. Div. of Montgomery Elevator Co., 641
F. Supp. 616, 617-19 (D. Kan. 1986) (declining to follow Sutton).
107. 799 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1986).
108. Id. at 124.
109. Id. at 124 n.2.
110. Id. The Herring court stated that workers' compensation rights are rooted in state law,
rather than in the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
11. See id.
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In Johnson v. Hussman Corp.,12 the Eighth Circuit squarely faced the
section 301 preemption issue" 3 and held that section 301 preempted Mis-
souri's workers' compensation discharge tort claim as applied to a union
employee." 4 The Johnson court's application of the Lueck test, however,
merely consisted of a conclusory statement that the state claim was preempted
because its resolution was substantially dependent upon analysis of the labor
contract." 5 The court did not explain what circumstances made it necessary
to refer to the labor contract in resolving the tort claim. Herring and Johnson
are of little help in resolving the issue of preemption of workers' compen-
sation discharge claim because of their cursory applications of the Lueck
test.
After Johnson, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue
in Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div. 1 6 In a more thorough
application of the Lueck test than either the Herring or Johnson courts
conducted," 7 the court concluded that section 301 did not preempt the claim.
In Baldracchi, an employee filed suit in state court, instead of filing an
unjust discharge grievance under her union contract, and alleged that she
had been fired for filing a workers' compensation claim in violation of
Connecticut law." ' The employer removed the case to federal court and
argued that section 301 preempted the state claim. '9 The court first examined
the nature of the statutory workers' compensation discharge claim and
112. 805 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1986).
113. Id. at 796. In the earlier two federal court of appeals decisions that had considered the
preemptive effect of section 301 on workers' compensation discharge claims, the courts had to
decide whether the respective state supreme courts would even extend the tort to union
employees. While section 301 preemption was discussed in each case, it was not an issue before
the courts. See Herring v. Prince Macaroni of New Jersey, Inc., 799 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1986);
Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co, 762 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1985).
114. Johnson v. Hussman Corp., 805 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1986).
115. Id. The Johnson court stated: "Here, applicant's state tort claim for retaliatory discharge
for filing a workers' compensation claim has been preempted by federal law because resolution
of that claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the term of an agreement between the
parties in a labor contract." Id. It is also possible that some judges on the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals may be looking to reevaluate Johnson in an en banc decision. In Wolfe v. Central
Mine Equip. Co., 126 L.R.R.M. 2247, 2248 (8th Cir. 1987), a three judge panel wrote in
response to an employee's argument that a workers' compensation discharge claim was inde-
pendent of the labor contract: "On the face of it, these arguments have some appeal. This
panel, however is bound by Johnson. Only the court en banc may overrule a decision of a
panel. The same arguments that Wolfe wages here could have been presented with equal force
in Johnson itself .... The Wolfe opinion was subsequently withdrawn when a rehearing en
banc was granted. Wolfe, 827 F.2d at 372.
116. 814 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1987).
117. The Baldracchi court attempted to analyze the workers' compensation discharge claim
in the context of each aspect of the Lueck opinion: (1) federal policy, (2) the "substantially-
dependent" test and (3) the Supreme Court's own limitations placed on that test. See Baldracchi,
814 F.2d 103-106.
118. Id. at 103.
119. Id.
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concluded that resolution of the claim was completely independent of the
labor contract's "just cause" provision.'20 The court reasoned that, in order
to defend the state action on the merits, the employer would not have to
prove that the employee had been fired for just cause as required by the
contract.12 1 Instead, the employer would merely have to show that the
employee's filing of a workmens' compensation claim did not prompt the
employee's discharge-whether the discharge was justified in any other way
would be irrelevant. 22
The Baldracchi court also addressed the language in Lueck intended to
limit the preemptive effect of its test to a narrow range of truly dependent
state claims, 23 and concluded that workers' compensation discharge claims
were not intended to be preempted. The court noted that the rights provided
by Connecticut's workers' compensation statute could not be bargained away
by contracting parties. 2 4 The court further relied on Lueck's statement that
section 301 does not grant contracting parties the right to bargain for what
is illegal under state law and concluded that any attempt to cut off employees'
right to workers' compensation would be illegal.'25
The Baldracchi court was the last federal court of appeals prior to the
Seventh Circuit in Lingle to rule on the issue.'16 Baldracchi, moreover,
presented a complete and persuasive analysis of Lueck's effect on workers'
compensation discharge claims and could have been persuasive authority in
any other circuit's disposition of the issue. The Seventh Circuit, however,
read section 301's preemptive scope more broadly than many other courts.127
A result founded on the ambiguity of the Lueck opinion which made
conflicting interpretations more likely. Likewise, two Supreme Court cases
addressing section 301 preemption subsequent to Lueck did little to clear up
the ambiguity because they shed no new light on the application of the
test. 28 It was against this background of conflicting federal and state deci-
sions that the Seventh Circuit decided Lingle.
II. LINGLE V. NORGE Div. OF MAGIC CHEF, INC.
A. Facts and Procedure
In the first of the two companion cases appealed from the Southern
District of Illinois,'2 9 Jonna Lingle brought suit in state court alleging that
120. Id. at 105.
121. Id.
122. Id. See also Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1053 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
123. Baldracchi, 814 F.2d at 106.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Lueck, 471 U.S. at 213).
126. See Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1048.
127. See infra notes 101-106, 163-170 and accompanying text.
128. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 107 S. Ct. 2161 (1987) (preempting
state claim for breach of union's duty to provide safe workplace); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams,
107 S. Ct. 2425 (1987) (applying the well-pleaded complaint rule to § 301 preemption). See also
supra notes 13, 14 and accompanying text.
129. Martin v. Carling National Breweries, No. 85-3321, slip op. (S.D. Il. April 11, 1986);
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her employer, Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., fired her for filing a
claim under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. 130 Lingle had notified
her employer that she had been injured on the job."' Lingle then filed a
workers' compensation claim, but Norge fired her for allegedly filing a false
claim.132 The labor contract contained a "just cause" provision, and after
Lingle's union filed a grievance on her behalf, she successfully arbitrated
the claim and was reinstated with back pay.' Lingle's subsequent state
court suit alleged retaliatory discharge and demanded general damages.134
Norge did not argue section 301 preemption to the state circuit court, but
instead removed the case to federal district court on the basis of diversity. 35
In federal court, Norge argued that Lingle's workers' compensation discharge
claim was preempted by section 301 and should be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 13 6 Lingle argued that her claim was not preempted
because it was independent of the labor contract under the Lueck test. 37
The district court relied on Lueck and held that Lingle's claim was preempted
by section 301 because it was inextricably intertwined with the "just cause"
provision of the contract. 38 Lingle appealed.
Martin v. Carling Nat'l Breweries,3 9 the companion case to Lingle, was
very similar to Lingle except that Martin alleged she was fired after she had
informed her employer that she intended to file a workers' compensation
claim. 4° Moreover, Martin did not pursue her rights under the collective
bargaining agreement but, instead, filed her retaliatory discharge claim in
an Illinois state court. 141 Carling removed the case to federal district court
under 28 U.S.C. section 1441(b) on the theory that the claim raised a federal
question. 142 In federal court, Carling argued that section 301 preempted
Martin's workers' compensation discharge claim. 43 Martin argued that her
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1448 (S.D. I11. 1985). See also supra
note 105.
130. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1034.
131. Id. at 1033.
132. Id.





138. Id. The district court, relying on Lueck, reasoned that to allow an independent tort
action for retaliatory discharge would undermine the mutually agreed upon procedures provided
for in a labor contract. Lingle, 618 F. Supp. at 1449.
139. See No. 85-3322, slip op. (S.D. Ill. April 11, 1986).
140. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1034.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1035. Section 1441(b) provides: "Any civil action of which the district courts
have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties
or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence
of the parties . 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982). See infra notes 152-162 and accompanying
test.
143. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1035.
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claim actually arose under state workers' compensation law and moved for
the court to remand the case back to state court because 28 U.S.C. 1445(c)
barred the removal of workers' compensation claims. 1" The district court
denied Martin's motion to remand 145 and subsequently held that section 301
preempted her workers' compensation discharge claim, relying on its earlier
decision in Lingle without opinion. 14 Martin appealed.
The issues presented in the appeals of these cases were (1) whether the
plaintiffs' retaliatory discharge claims were removable 47 and, if so, (2)
whether the claims were preempted by section 301.141
B. The Court's Rationale-Majority Opinion
The Lingle majority held that both of the workers' compensation discharge
claims were properly removed to federal court and preempted by section
301.141 The court stated that in order to reach the merits of a section 301
preemption defense after removal a federal court must first determine that
it has subject matter jurisdiction over the case, and added that a federal
court only has jurisdiction over properly removed cases.150 The court then
addressed and dismissed Martin's claim that section 1445(c) barred removal
of the workers' compensation discharge claim because it arose under the
Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. 51
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) provides: "A civil action in any state court arising under the
workmen's compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of the
United States." Martin's argument that a common law tort claim could constitute "a civil
action ... arising under the workmen's compensation laws" of a state was new at the time.
Two federal courts of appeals subsequently accepted the analogy. Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney
Aircraft Div., 814 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1987); Herring v. Prince Macaroni of New Jersey,
Inc., 799 F.2d 120, 124 n.2 (3rd Cir. 1987).
145. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1035.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1035, 1037-42.
148. Id. at 1035, 1042-47.
149. Id. at 1047.
150. Id. at 1037. The court stated that it would be illogical to consider the substantive issue
of federal preemption before it determined whether it had subject matter jurisdiction over the
case. Id.
151. The court relied on a two step analysis to conclude that section 1445(c) did not bar
removal of workers' compensation discharge claims. First, the court stated that a state's
characterization of a tort claim as arising under its "workmens' compensation laws" does not
bind a federal court because the interpretation of section 1445(c) is a matter of federal law.
Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1039. Second, the statutory term "workmen's compensation laws" was not
meant to include state common law tort claims. Id. The court relied, in part, on the fact that
section 1445(c) was passed to help ease the burden on federal court dockets and not, by
implication, for substantive reasons. S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, reprinted in
1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 3104, 3106. Moreover, the court found support for
its conclusion in a desk reference publication used by federal agencies that defines workers'
compensation as providing employees with limited no-fault compensation for injuries in exchange
for the elimination of general tort rules. LAsoN, WoRKM.aN's COMPENSATION § 1.10 (desk ed.
1986) (emphasis added). The court reasoned that this definition could not possibly include a
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The' Lingle court next examined whether the plaintiffs' workers' compen-
sation discharge claims raised federal questions and thereby were properly
removed under 28 U.S.C. section 1441(b). 152 The Supreme Court has long
held that under section 1441(b) federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal
question is presented on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. 153 Furthermore,
even a defense of federal preemption will not ordinarily give rise to federal
jurisdiction under section 1441(b). 54 The court first stated that, although the
usual test for a federal question looks only to the plaintiff's complaint for
issues of federal law, a strict application of this well-pleaded complaint rule
in section 301 preemption cases would prevent federal courts from ever
hearing those cases because employees could easily avoid raising federal
questions by careful drafting."' Finding this a danger to the federal interest
in determining section 301's preemptive scope, the court held that it would
apply the artful-pleading doqtrine and look behind the face of the plaintiffs'
complaints to determine whether the couching of their claims in state law
terms was a mere ploy to avoid federal jurisdiction.15 6 The court held that
the test for a federal question in section 301 preemption cases should ask
whether the state claim is sufficiently independent of the labor contract to
avoid removal. 1 7 If the state claim was not found to be sufficiently inde-
pendent of the contract, removal would then be proper.,'
The Lingle court applied its test and concluded that the plaintiffs' claims
were not sufficiently independent of the contract to avoid removal. 5 9 The
court relied on Seventh Circuit precedent which had characterized various
types of retaliatory discharge tort claims as analogous to wrongful discharge
tort claim. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1039 n.9. Accord Smith v. Union Carbide Corp., 644 F. Supp.
290, 291 (E. D. Tenn. 1987). Contra Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 814 F.2d
102, 105 (2d Cir. 1987) (§ 1445(c) reveals congressional intention not to interfere with workers'
compensation rights including tort claims if based on those rights); Herring v. Prince Macaroni
of New Jersey, Inc., 799 F.2d 120, 124 n.2 (3rd Cir. 1986) (workers' compensation discharge
claim "is part-and-parcel of the state's workers' compensation scheme").
152. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1035. For the text of section 1441(b), see supra note 142.
153. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936). See also Caterpillar, Inc. v.
Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425 (1987) (addressing application of the well-pleaded complaint rule in
context of § 301 preemption).
154. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal.,
463 U.S. 1, 12 (1983). See generally Comment, Federal Preemption, Removal Jurisdiction and
the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 634 (1984) (discussing difficulties that
arise when court attempts to apply the well-pleaded complaint rule in preemption cases).
155. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1040 (citing Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. at 2428).
156. Under federal labor preemption law, the artful-pleading exception is usually referred to
as the complete preemption doctrine. Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. at 2426. The complete preemption
doctrine applies when the preemptive force of a statute is so "extraordinary" that it "converts
an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the
well-pleaded complaint rule." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 107 S. Ct. 1542, 1547
(1987).
157. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1040 (citing Lueck, 471 U.S. at 213-14).
158. Id. at 1040.
159. Id. at 1041.
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breach-of-contract claims.160 The court further reasoned that the workers'
compensation discharge claims had been artfully pled because they actually
sounded in contract and would have to be resolved in accordance with the
labor contract. 61 The court concluded that, because the claims fit within the
artful pleading rule, they actually arose under federal law and were therefore
removable under section i441(b). 162
The Lingle court next addressed whether section 301 preempted the work-
ers' compensation discharge claims. The court noted that it had to determine
preemption under the Lueck test163 as reaffirmed in International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers v. Hechler. 64 The court cited four recent Seventh Circuit
decisions that had discussed or resulted in preemption under section 301 161
and one Seventh Circuit decision that resulted in preemption of a retaliatory
discharge claim under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"). 66 Of the section
301 cases, two faced the preemption issue squarely, while the other two
decided that the facts presented could only give rise to federal claims under
section 301 because the state tort claims alleged had not yet been recognized
by the relevant states. 67 The two cases that had faced the preemption issue
preempted state claims alleging tortious breaches of labor contracts as op-
160. Id. The Lingle court relied on three cases. See Mitchell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers, Inc.,
772 F.2d 342 (7th Cir.) (tortious termination of employment is actually breach of contract
claim), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1266 (1986); Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co., 762 F.2d 511
(7th Cir. 1985) (Indiana's workers' compensation discharge tort is actually allegation of breach
of collective bargaining agreement); Oglesby v. RCA Corp., 752 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Indiana retaliatory discharge claim for refusal to violate federal OSHA regulations is actually
wrongful discharge claim under labor contract).
161. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1041.
162. Id.
163. Id. See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text.
164. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1043-,4 (citing Hechler, 107 S. Ct. at 2168).
165. See Gibson v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 782 F.2d 686 (7th Cir.) (claim based on
fraud perpetrated by labor contract itself preempted by § 301), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3275
(1986); Mitchell, 772 F.2d 342 (involuntary discharge in violation of collective bargaining
agreement preempted by § 301); Vantine, 762 F.2d at 517 (Indiana's workers' compensation
discharge claim would be preempted by § 301 if extended to union employees); Oglesby, 752
F.2d 272 (Indiana tort of wrongful discharge for following OSHA standards preempted by
§ 301).
166. Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 790 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1986) (claim alleging
retaliatory discharge for filing Federal Employers' Liability Act suit preempted by Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-177 (1982)).
167. The issue before the Vantine court was whether Indiana would extend its workers'
compensation discharge tort to union employees. Vantine, 762 F.2d at 517. The Oglesby court
preempted a claim of wrongful discharge where the plaintiff had refused to perform a task that
he asserted was in violation of federal occupational health and safety law. Oglesby, 752 F.2d.
at 278. The court found it crucial that Indiana had not recognized such a tort claim, id. at 276
n. 1, and that, even if it had, such a claim would not be rooted in state public policy because
the right being asserted was a federal one. Id. at 276 n.3. Oglesby, moreover, was decided
before the Supreme Court enunciated the Lueck test.
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posed to tort actions based on non-contractual duties.16 The RLA case, on
the other hand, preempted an employee's state claim alleging discharge in
retaliation for filing a Federal Employers' Liability Act suit. The case,
however, did not rely on section 301 preemption doctrine and, in fact,
distinguished it. 169 The Lingle majority concluded that these prior decisions
mandated preemption because workers' compensation discharge claims were
no less dependent on the labor contract simply because they involved the
workers' compensation statute. 7
0
Rather than simply rely on and follow these cases, the Lingle court
undertook to apply the Lueck preemption test to the facts presented. The
court held that the workers' compensation discharge claims were inextricably
intertwined with the labor contract because the labor contract's "just cause"
provision was broad enough in scope to prohibit firing an employee for
filing a workers' compensation claim.' 7' Although the court took note of
the plaintiffs' characterization of the claims as independent of the collective
bargaining agreement, 72 it disagreed with the means by which the plaintiffs
arrived at the conclusion.' The court stated that to analyze the nature of
the state claim before determining the scope of the pertinent contract pro-
vision would allow states to circumvent federal labor policies. 74
168. Gibson, 782 F.2d at 686 and Mitchell, 772 F.2d at 342, both resulted in preemption
under the Lueck test. In Gibson, the court preempted an employee's fraud claim based on
information that was withheld by the employer during bargaining. Gibson, 782 F.2d at 689.
The employee claimed that the fraud caused him to lose benefits provided in the collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 687. The court, however, held that the claim was preempted under
Lueck because the benefit being claimed would not have existed without the contractual
provision. Id. at 688. In Mitchell, the court preempted an employee's claim that he had
tortiously been forced to resign. Mitchell, 772 F.2d at 346-47. The court characterized his claim
as one for wrongful discharge and found that absent the labor contract's "just cause" provision
he would have had no right to not be discharged without cause. Accordingly, the court concluded
that the state claim was substantially dependent upon the labor contract and preempted under
Lueck. Id. Both cases, therefore, involved state claims that could not have existed in the absence
of the labor contracts.
169. Graf, 790 F.2d at 1348. The Graf court found inapplicable a Ninth Circuit decision
involving section 301 preemption. Id. The court, moreover, relied primarily on its previous
decision in Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 717 F.2d 1045, 1052 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984), which found the RLA provided a stronger case for preemption
than the other labor statutes. Graf, 790 F.2d at 1348.
170. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1046.
171. Id.
172. Id. The plaintiff-appellants had argued that the worker's compensation discharge claim
was not preempted because there was no need to analyze the contract in order to resolve the
claim. Id. Accord Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 814 F.2d 102, 106 (2nd Cir.
1987). See also Note, supra note 19, at 816 (1985) (workers' compensation discharge claim
should not be preempted, in part, because it can be resolved without reference to "just cause"
provision of labor contract).
173. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1046.
174. Id. In particular, the Lingle court concluded that plaintiff-appellants' proposal to analyze
the state claim first under the Lueck test would circumvent the arbitration and grievance
procedures envisioned by Congress as exclusive remedies for employees protected by labor
contracts. Id.
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The Lingle court compared its conclusion with that of other federal courts
of appeals on the preemption issue. The Lingle court noted that the Tenth,
Third, and Second Circuits had decided that section 301 did not preempt
the workers' compensation discharge tort, 75 but the court chose not to
follow what it regarded as faulty reasoning by those circuits. The court also
addressed various section 301 preemption decisions from the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals 7 and concluded that its decision "would not conflict"
with the Ninth Circuit's approach. 177 Finally, the Lingle court relied on the
fact that the Eighth Circuit had come to the same conclusion in an analogous
case. 178
The Lingle court then went beyond the facts of the case before it and
held that section 301 would preempt all retaliatory discharge claims because
a "just cause" provision would always prohibit the conduct prohibited by
the state-law claim. 79 The court concluded that the plaintiffs' claims must
be dismissed because they could not continue as section 301 claims either. 80
175. Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 814 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1987), see supra
notes 116-126 and accompanying text; Herring v. Prince Macaroni of New Jersey, Inc., 799
F.2d 120, 124 n.2 (3rd Cir. 1986), see supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text; Peabody
Galion v. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981). It should be noted, however, that Peabody
was not a section 301 preemption case, but rather, a case involving preemption of a workers'
compensation discharge claim under NLRA doctrines. Peabody, 666 F.2d at 1313. See supra
notes 48-59 and accompanying text. Subsequent to Lingle, the Tenth Circuit adopted an
approach similar to Baldracchi. See Local No. 57 v. Bechtel Power Co., 834 F.2d 884 (10th
Cir. 1987).
176. The Lingle court noted that, while a pre-Lueck Ninth Circuit case held that section 301
did not preempt a retaliatory discharge claim where it protected state public policy, Garibaldi
v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985),
the Ninth Circuit's post-Lueck opinions seemed to indicate a broader sphere of section 301
preemption. Id. See Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984)
(preempting claim alleging retaliatory discharge for filing federal OSHA violations). See also
De Soto v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 811 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1987) (preempting alleged
retaliatory discharge for mistakenly acting on belief that employer was in violation of state
OSHA regulations).
177. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1049-50. The Lingle court, however, misinterpreted the Ninth
Circuit's trend. After Lingle was decided, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that section
301 did not preempt a retaliatory discharge claim for refusing to work in violation of California's
state OSHA regulations. Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987) In Paige,
the court reaffirmed the Ninth Circuit's section 301 preemption exception for retaliatory
discharge claims which violated state public policy and cited Garibaldi with approval. Id. at
863. The Ninth Circuit, moreover, views the workers' compensation discharge tort as a violation
of public policy. Garibaldi, 726 F.2d at 1371 n.6 (dicta).
The Paige court distinguished both Olguin and De Soto, the keys to the Lingle court's trend
analysis. Id. at 863. See supra note 176. See also Tellez v. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 817 F.2d
536 (9th Cir.) (state tort claims of defamation, and negligent and intentional infliction of mental
distress, not preempted by § 301), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 251 (1987).
178. Johnson v. Hussman Corp., 805 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1986). See also supra notes 113-16
and accompanying text.
179. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1049.
180. Id. at 1050. In order to bring a § 301 claim, an employee must first exhaust all available
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C. The Dissenting Opinion
Judge Ripple, in a dissent joined by Judge Cudahy, began by pointing
out that questions of federalism should always be approached carefully.'
He agreed with the majority that Lueck required preemption of a state claim
when its resolution is inextricably intertwined with the terms of a labor
contract.'82 Equally important to the dissent, however, was Lueck's limiting
language stating that, in extending section 301's preemptive effect beyond
state breach-of-contract claims, it would be inconsistent with congressional
intent to preempt state rules that proscribe conduct or establish rights and
obligations independent of a labor contract.'83
The dissent criticized the majority's application of the Lueck test as both
one-sided and unfocused. 8 4 The dissent first distinguished the state law in
Lueck from the state law in Lingle. Judge Ripple stressed that, in Lueck,
the duty of the empldyer to provide insurance in good faith derived solely
from the collective bargaining agreement while, in Lingle, the right to
workers' compensation is guaranteed by Illinois statute to all workers. 185 To
illustrate that the workers' compensation discharge claim's resolution was
independent of the contract, Judge Ripple pointed out that the employer
need only prove that the employee was not fired for filing a workers'
compensation claim in order to defend the lawsuit. 86 The dissent agreed
with the plaintiffs that there would be no need for the employer to prove
that the employee had been fired for just cause as defined by the labor
contract. 187
The dissent also addressed what it viewed as the many theoretical and
practical difficulties created by the majority's decision. Judge Ripple ques-
tioned whether any limits were left on section 301's preemptive effect after
Lingle. 88 He also pointed to the practical difficulties that Lingle would create
in Illinois because the Illinois Supreme Court had reached the opposite
contractual remedies. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 662 (1965). There are
four exceptions to the exhaustion of remedies rule: (1) where the conduct of the employer
amounts to a repudiation of the contractual procedures; (2) where the grievance procedures
would be futile; (3) where the union has been relieved of the obligation to represent the
employee, see D'Amato v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 760 F.2d 1474, 1488 (7th Cir. 1985); or (4)
where the union has breached its duty of fair representation, see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,
186-88 (1967). See generally Smith, supra note 2, at 52-53 (discussing the four exceptions to
the exhaustion of remedies requirement and articulating possible fifth exception, derived from
lower court decisions, for state tort actions protecting public policy).
181. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1051 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1052.
184. Id. at 1053.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1054 (citing Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 814 F.2d 102, 105 (2d
Cir. 1987)).
188. Id.
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result.'19 Moreover, he criticized the majority for creating a major legal
conflict within Illinois with no direct Supreme Court precedent to support
its conclusion.190 Finally, he pointed out that, in fact, the majority had
ignored a Supreme Court precedent that conflicted with its conclusion.' 9'
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Validity Of The Removal Analysis
A brief summary of the Lingle court's removal analysis is necessary in
order to understand how the court erred. The court held that a federal court
presented with a section 301 defense must first determine that it has subject
matter jurisdiction through proper removal before it can address the merits
of the preemption claim.192 The court correctly noted that a strict application
of the well-pleaded complaint rule would deprive lower federal courts of the
opportunity to ever address this important federal issue. 93 The court rea-
soned, however, that a federal court should apply the artful pleading doctrine' 94
in order to allow removal in certain preemption cases. 191 The court held that
application of the federal court test for an artfully pled federal question in
section 301 preemption cases is necessary to determine whether a state claim
is sufficiently independent of the labor contract so as to avoid removal. 196
The court concluded that it could proceed with its preemption review only
because the state claim was dependent upon the labor contract and, therefore,
properly removable. 97
The Lingle court cited two authorities in support of its removal analysis:
the Supreme Court's decision Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 98 and a law
review article on federal jurisdiction in preemption removal cases by Mary
189. Id. at 1055.
190. Id.
191. Id. See Pan Am World Airways, Inc. v. Puchert, 472 U.S. 1001 (1985) (Railway Labor
Act did not preempt workers' compensation discharge claim), dismissing appeal from Puchert
v. Agsalud, 67 Haw. 25, 677 P.2d 449 (1984). See also infra notes 263-273 and accompanying
text.
192. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), removal is proper only when the complaint itself raises a
federal question-a federal defense ordinarily is insufficient. See supra notes 152-54 and
accompanying text.
193. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1043.
194. Under federal labor preemption terminology, the "artful" pleading exception is known
as the complete preemption doctrine. See supra note 156. The significance of the Lingle court's
technical misstatement is apparent because the result brought about by a determination that a
state tort claim is an artfully pled section 301 claim is that the state claim itself is, in fact,
preempted. The use of the proper term would have made this point clearer and perhaps avoided
the confusion altogether. See infra notes 198-216 and accompanying text.
195. See infra note 196.
196. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1040 (citing Lueck, 471 U.S. at 213-14).
197. Id. at 1041.
198. 107 S. Ct. 2425 (1987).
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P. Twitchell. 99 In Caterpillar, employees sued in state court alleging that
their employer breached individual employment contracts with them.2°° The
company removed the case to federal court and argued preemption. 20 The
Supreme Court noted that, while the well-pleaded complaint rule would
normally prevent removal of a section 301 case, 0 2 the complete preemption
doctrine203 would allow removal when the core of a state law complaint is
actually a clause in a collective bargaining agreement.2z 4 The Caterpillar court
used the Lueck test to determine whether the state claim was substantially
dependent upon the labor contract and, therefore, removable.205 In other
words, a state law claim will only raise a federal question and be removable
if it is clearly preempted under Lueck.2°6 Preemption, under Caterpillar,
must be considered first in order to determine if the complete preemption
doctrine applies and the case is removable.
Despite the Lingle court's reliance on Caterpillar as support for its removal
analysis, the cases are in direct conflict on that issue. While Caterpillar
applied the complete preemption doctrine and held that a state court action
is only removable if it is clearly preempted,20 7 Lingle held that a federal
court cannot reach the merits of the preemption issue unless the case is
removable. 2° The Lingle court further confused the matter by using the
preemption test itself to determine removability.2 09 The Lingle analysis is
wrong because once a case is held removable, it is already preempted as a
matter of law. 210 To continue with a substantive preemption analysis is
pointless because there is no need to decide the preemption issue twice.
199. Twitchell, Characterizing Federal Claims: Preemption, Removal, and the Arising-Under
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 812 (1986).
200. Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. at 2427-28.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2429 (citing Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936)) (plaintiff
is ordinarily the master of his complaint and can characterize plea any way he wishes). For
more background, see supra note 158.
203. Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. at 2430.
204. Id. (citing Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 376 F.2d 337, 340 (6th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S.
557 (1968)).
205. Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. 2431.
206. See id. The Caterpillar court stated a state tort complaint is removable when "the pre-
emptive force of § 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action ....
Any such suit is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law would
provide a cause of action in the absence of § 301." Id. at 2430 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of
Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983)).
207. Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. 2431.
208. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1038.
209. Id. at 1040. Although Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. at 2431-32, held that the Lueck preemption
test determines removability and is thus somewhat in accord with Lingle, the use of such a test
is completely inconsistent with the view that removability and preemption are always discrete
issues. The Lingle court, however, held that a federal court must first determine removability
before proceeding to preemption and must always distinguish between the two, yet also held
that the test for removability is the very same as that for preemption.
210. See Caterpillar, 107 S. Ct. at 2430.
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The Lingle court also relied on a recent article on federal jurisdiction in
preemption removal cases by Mary P. Twitchell. In her article, Twitchell
argues that the complete preemption doctrine may upset federalism concerns
by reaching the preemption issue in cases that could be summarily remanded
to state court before the issue was reached.211 Twitchell proposes a three-
part test that gives a federal court two preliminary opportunities to remand
a section 301 preemption case before applying the complete preemption
doctrine as the third prong of the test. 212 Twitchell admits, however, that
the third prong of her test for removability is, and must be, a substantive
application of the Lueck preemption test. 213 Under Twitchell's test, a state
law claim is ultimately only removable to federal court if it is preempted-
the test simply gives a federal court two preliminary chances to remand
before reaching the preemption issue. 214 The Twitchell article provides no
support for the Lingle court's removal analysis because the court applied
only the third prong of her test-substantive preemption review-and, by
doing so, decided the substantive preemption issue. Therefore, when the
court proceeded to what it viewed as preemption review, it was deciding the
matter for the second time. Twitchell's article provides no support for this
manner of preemption analysis.
Contrary to its claim, therefore, the Lingle court had no support for
electing to decide the preemption issue twice and criticizing the federal district
court for not following its redundant application of removal doctrine. 215
Moreover, the court's confused removal analysis unnecessarily complicated
an already muddled set of section 301 precedents.2 1 6 In sum, the court's
removal analysis was, at best, unnecessary, but may also have been symp-
tomatic of a fundamental misunderstanding of section 301 preemption doc-
trine.
B. Lingle's Preemption Analysis: The Wrong Conclusion by Expanding
the Lueck Approach
The Lingle court significantly altered the section 301 preemption test and
came to the wrong conclusion through its unbalanced reading of section 301
211. Twitchell, supra note 199, at 861-62.
212. Id. at 865-69. Twitchell argues that a reviewing federal court must determine whether
Congress has given the plaintiff alleging the state claim an express cause of action under the
federal regulatory scheme. If not, the suit must be remanded. If the plaintiff has a federal
cause of action that could have been brought instead, the federal court must then determine
whether the defendant could reasonably argue that Congress intended that the regulatory scheme
preempt the state law claim. If not, the claim must be remanded. If the state claim is not
remanded under either of the first two prongs of the test, the federal court must then proceed
with full substantive review under the complete-preemption doctrine. If the state claim is
completely preempted, it is not only removed to federal court but preempted as well. If not,
the claim must be remanded under the well-pleaded complaint rule. Id.
213. Id. at 866-67.
214. Id.
215. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1037 (criticizing district court in Lingle and Martin for addressing
preemption before removability).
216. See Twitchell, supra note 199, at 812-16 (describing general confusion in preemption
caselaw with specific references to § 301 cases).
[Vol. 37:675
1988] LINGLE v. NORGE DIV. OF MAGIC CHEF, INC. 707
preemption precedents and policies. Contrary to the court's statement, it
was not bound by any of its own precedents involving section 301 preemption.
Of the four cases cited, only two squarely faced the preemption issue, and
both presented clear cases for preemption under Lueck because the duties
that were alleged to have been breached in those cases existed only because
of a collective bargaining agreement. 21 7
Lingle, however, involved a claim that existed with or without a labor
contract and for breach of a state, not a contractual, duty.2 18 Thus, it was
not within the rules set out in prior Seventh Circuit decisions. Furthermore,
Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern RR., a Railway Labor Act preemption case,
should not have been controlling or even relevant because the rule had always
been that the RLA's language and structure required broader preemption
principles than did the NLRA/LMRA.2 1 9 Even accepting the applicability of
the RLA preemption doctrine, Graf can not only be distinguished on other
pertinent grounds, its use by the court raises another analytical problem
discussed below. 220
With no controlling precedent to consider, the Lingle court's decision must
rest on its reading of Lueck, federal policy and the prior decisions of the
other circuits that had decided the same issue. The Lingle court relied on
the interest in a uniform set of labor laws, and the desire to encourage
arbitration rather than litigation to resolve labor disputes to find that section
301 preempted the workers' compensation discharge tort. 2 ' The Lingle court,
however, applied the Lueck test solely to further these two federal policies,
and ignored the fact that Lueck itself represents the Supreme Court's ultimate
determination of how those policies are to be applied in section 301 pre-
emption cases.2 22 Lingle also parted ways with the majority of federal circuits
that had applied Lueck to the workers' compensation issue without offering
an adequate justification for doing so. 223
In Lueck, the Supreme Court certainly did point out the federal interests
in uniformity and arbitration as major forces requiring preemption of certain
state tort claims under section 301 .224 Lueck, however, also pointed out a
217. See supra notes 167-68.
218. See supra notes 91-100.
219. See, e.g., Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 717 F.2d 1045, 1052 (7th Cir. 1983), cert
denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984); Koehler v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 109 I11. 2d 473, 488
N.E.2d 542, 544-45 (1985), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 3297 (1986). See supra note 169.
220. See infra notes 263-273 and accompanying text.
221. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211 (1985) (citing Teamsters v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95, 103-04
(1962)).
222. The entire purpose of a legal test is to limit lower courts in their applications of all the
competing interests in a given area of law. The goal of the high court in the jurisdictional
structure is to synthesize the policy interest into an applicable rule so that some uniformity
among the lower courts can be achieved. See Quinlan, The Illinois Appellate Court: An
Intermediate Appellate Court-Does It Have a Future? ABA, Appellate Judges Newsletter
(Winter 1986-87).
223. See infra notes 238-46, 254-55 and accompanying text.
224. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211-12.
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countervailing interest, i.e., a great reluctance to preempt state tort actions
unless absolutely necessary. 2 5 In particular, the Supreme Court explained
that "it would be inconsistent with congressional intent [in section 301] to
preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations,
independent of a labor contract."2 26 Moreover, the Lueck Court emphasized
that it had only minimally expanded section 301's preemptive scope and that
section 301 should only preempt a state-law claim when it is substantially
dependent upon analysis of the contract's terms.2 27
The key word of the Lueck test is "dependent" and the Lueck Court's
application of its own test illustrates that fact. The Court stressed that, but
for the labor contract's creation of a duty on the part of the employer to
provide insurance to its employees, the employee in Lueck would have had
no claim at all. 2 Thus, the tortious bad-faith breach-of-contract claim at
issue in Lueck was preempted because it was substantially dependent upon
analysis of the labor contract within the meaning of the test. 229 The Court
never stated, as did the Lingle court, that the terms of the labor contract
would determine section 301's preemptive scope. Instead, the Court viewed
the nature of the state claim as the crucial factor. 2
0
Another case illustrative of the Supreme Court's application of the Lueck
"substantially dependent" test is International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
Hechler.21 In Hechler, the court reaffirmed the Lueck test and applied it to
a state tort claim alleging the breach of a union's duty to provide a safe
workplace. 23 2 The Hechler court preempted the state claim following a but-
for analysis similar to the Lueck test. 233 The court reasoned that, under
Florida common law, only employers owed a duty to provide their employees
with a safe workplace, not unions. 23 4 As in Lueck, therefore, the employee
in Hechler would not have had a claim "but-for" the labor contract's
provision that the union had a duty to provide the employee with a safe
workplace.235 The Hechler court concluded that section 301 preempted the
state-law claim because its existence substantially depended upon the union's
duty under the contract. 2 6 In both Lueck and Hechler, therefore, the Su-
225. Id. at 220-21. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
226. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 212.
227. Id. at 220-21.
228. Id. at 218.
229. If the Lueck Court had not preempted the claim, it would have impinged on the federal
policy favoring contractual agreements and remedies because employers would hesitate to assume
any new contractual obligations if any breach of them could give rise to tort claims with general
and punitive damages. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211.
230. See id. at 213-14.
231. 107 S. Ct. 2161 (1987).
232. Id. at 2166-67.
233. Id. at 2168.
234. Id. at 2167.
235. Id. at 2167-68.
236. Id.
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preme Court applied the substantially-dependent test by examining the state-
law claim to determine whether it merely derived from the contract or had
an independent source. 23 7
The Illinois Supreme Court and most federal circuit courts of appeals
followed the United States Supreme Court's application of the Lueck test in
determining whether section 301 preempted the workers' compensation dis-
charge tort.28 These courts asked whether the employee could have brought
a workers' compensation claim in the absence of a contractual provision
that employees could only be fired for just cause. 2 9 These courts concluded
that all employees are entitled to file workers' compensation claims regardless
of the existence of a labor contract and, therefore, Lueck's but-for analysis
did not result in preemption. 240
The Illinois Supreme Court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, went one step further in testing for section 301's preemption of
workers' compensation discharge claims and inquired whether the labor
contracts would have to be referred to by either party in resolving the
claims. 24 1 These courts concluded that neither employer nor employee would
need to refer to the "just cause" provision or that provision's interpretation
in order to resolve the workers' compensation discharge claims at issue
because all the elements of the tort claim were provided by state law. 242
Accordingly, the courts held that the workers' compensation discharge claims
were not substantially dependent upon analysis of the labor contracts. 243
The Lingle court, however, applied the Lueck substantially-dependent test
differently. The Lingle court merely acknowledged the language in Lueck
that limited the application of the test,2" but did not attempt to apply those
limits to the workers' compensation discharge claim. 24 , The Lingle court
instead focused on only two of the policies that affect section 301 preemp-
tion-achieving uniformity in labor laws, and encouraging employees to
arbitrate rather than litigate labor disputes-in what became its substantial
expansion of Lueck's preemptive scope. 246
237. See Lueck, 471 U.S. at 214-16; Hechler, 107 S. Ct. at 2167-68.
238. Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 814 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1987); Herring v.
Prince Macaroni of New Jersey, Inc., 799 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986); Gonzalez v. Prestress Eng'g
Corp., 115 Il1. 2d 1, 503 N.E.2d 308 (1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 3248 (1987). See also Paige
v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 826 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987) (decided after Lingle but using the "but-
for" approach in a similar situation).
239. See Baldracchi, 814 F.2d at 105; Herring, 799 F.2d at 124 n.2; Gonzalez, 115 11. 2d at
10-12, 503 N.E.2d at 312-13.
240. Id.
241. Baldracchi, 814 F.2d at 106; Gonzalez, 115 Il. 2d at 12-14, 503 N.E.2d at 314-15.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1046.
245. Id. at 1053 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
246. See generally Kinyon and Rohlik, supra note 8, at 23-37 (discussing other policies
including (1) sufficiency of the administrative remedy; (2) state interest in the tort; (3) whether
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The Lingle court read the Lueck test to require an examination of whether
the workers' compensation discharge tort was inextricably intertwined with
the "just cause" provision of the labor contract. 247 The Lingle court did
not, however, apply the but-for approach of either Lueck or Hechler. If the
court had done so, it could not have avoided the conclusion that the claim
did not depend on the labor contract for its existence. 248 Instead, the court
first examined the scope of the just cause provision and determined that it
prohibited the employer from firing employees simply for filing workers'
compensation claims.2 49 The Lingle court concluded that the workers' com-
pensation discharge claim was inextricably intertwined with the "just cause"
provision because the state claim prohibited the same activity prohibited by
the contract clause.
250
The Lingle court's application of the Lueck test is too expansive because
it broadens the scope of section 301's preemptive effect far beyond that
envisioned by Lueck. Under the Lingle approach to section 301 preemption,
whenever a labor contract prohibited certain tortious conduct, any state tort
that prohibited the same conduct would be preempted, regardless of the
nature of the state claim, the conduct at issue or any difference in remedies. 25 1
Lueck stated, however, that section 301 should not preempt every state-law
suit asserting a right that relates in some way to a provision in a labor
contract. 2 2 The limits placed on section 301 preemption by Lueck are
meaningless and unenforceable if the Lingle approach is used. 25 13 Moreover,
the Lingle court did not adequately address its sister circuits' rationales nor
that of the Illinois Supreme Court in its disagreement with their results.254
The court never explained why it disagreed with these courts except to say
the law is of general applicability or aimed solely at the union employment relationship; and
(4) a desire not to penalize workers for collectively bargaining). These other policies or factors
in determining preemption or fashioning an equitable preemption test were not even addressed
by the Lingle court.
247. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1042.
248. The fact that Illinois' workers' compensation discharge claim is available to at-will
employees is conclusive that, but for the contract in any given situation, the claim would
nevertheless be available to the employee who was discharged for filing a valid workers'
compensation claim. See Gonzalez, 115 I11. 2d at 9-14, 503 N.E.2d at 312-14.
249. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1046.
250. Id. See also Green v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 630 F. Supp. 423, 426-27 (S.D. Cal. 1985)
(preempting defamation claim because defamatory statements were central to rights and pro-
cedures provided under collective bargaining agreement).
251. For example, if the Lingle rationale is followed to its logical conclusion, a labor contract
clause that forbade the battering of employees and provided limited remedies under a grievance
procedure for breaches of the clause would preempt an employee's state common law battery
claim simply because the contract addressed the matter.
252. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211-12.
253. See, e.g., supra note 251. See also Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1053-54 (Ripple, J., dissenting)
(pointing out that there are no limits on majority's analysis).
254. The Lingle court, for example, never attempted to reconcile its application of the Lueck
test with the Lueck opinion. Nor did the Lingle court attempt to show a disparity between the
Baldracchi court's application of the Lueck test and Lueck itself.
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they were wrong, 255 nor did the court explain how the other courts' approach
to the Lueck test damaged the federal policies that Lingle relied upon. Any
in-depth analysis of its approach would have forced the Lingle court to
accept the fact that it was significantly altering the Lueck test.
The only justification articulated by the Lingle court for its broadened
application of the Lueck test was that federal labor policies required such
an approach.256 The Lingle court stated that the federal interest in uniform
labor laws and arbitration mandated its broadened view of section 301
preemption z.2 7 The Lingle court ignored, however, that its approach to section
301 preemption was inconsistent with federal labor policy articulated by the
Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts.218
In Metropolitan, the Court determined that the balance-of-power doctrine259
did not preempt a state statute which mandated minimum health care benefits
to be included in all general insurance policies that were part of employee
benefit packages. 26 Various insurance companies had argued that the statute
should be preempted because it upset the balance of power between labor
and management under the NLRA.2 61 The Metropolitan Court responded
that "[ilt would turn the policy that animated the [federal labor law] on its
head to understand it to have penalized workers who have chosen to join a
union by preventing them from benefiting from state labor regulations
imposing minimal standards on nonunion employers. ' 262 Though not a
section 301 preemption case, Metropolitan stressed that fairness toward
employees must always be weighed against the desire for uniformity and the
preference for arbitration in labor matters. The Lingle court ignored this
equally important concern in its analysis.
Finally, the Lingle court unjustifiably relied on its previous decision in
Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co.263 to support its preemption
analysis. In Graf, the court held that the Railway Labor Act (RLA)264
preempted an Illinois retaliatory discharge claim, but not in the workers'
compensation context. The Lingle court found Graf applicable to its section
301 analysis because the Seventh Circuit, in dicta from an earlier case,2 65
stated that the preemption standards for the RLA and the LMRA arguably
255. See Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1047-49.
256. Id. at 1047.
257. Id.
258. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
259. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
260. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 751 (1985).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 756.
263. 790 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1986).
264. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-77 (1982).
265. Lancaster v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 807, 816-17 (7th Cir. 1985), cert
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1602 (1987).
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should be the same.2 66 The Lingle court relied on this dicta in spite of the
fact that the general rule had been that the RLA's structural complexity
required a stricter preemption test than under either the NLRA or the
LMRA.
267
In finding RLA preemption doctrine applicable to section 301 preemption
the Lingle court should have discussed Puchert v. Agsalud26 s and Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc. v. Puchert.2 69 In Puchert, the Hawaii Supreme Court
held that the RLA did not preempt that state's tort of retaliatory discharge
for filing a workers' compensation claim.270 The employer in Puchert then
appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, however,
dismissed the appeal as not representing a substantial federal question.27'
Since the Lingle court considered RLA preemption cases equally dispositive
of the section 301 preemption issue, the court should have at least mentioned
Pan Am, a United States Supreme Court precedent in an analogous setting
that completely disagreed with its result. It is true that the Puchert opinion
was from another jurisdiction, but the approval given that opinion by the
United States Supreme Court in the appeal had precedential value in the
Seventh Circuit. The Lingle court, however, relied on the broad RLA
preemption language and holding of Graf to support its own broad appli-
cation of the Lueck test, and neglected to address the negative precedential
implications raised by its analysis. 271 Moreover, the language in Graf, re-
quiring preemption wherever federal labor policy might be affected, is in
direct conflict with Lueck.2 73
266. In Lancaster, 773 F.2d at 816-17, the court reasoned that the preemption doctrines
under both section 301 and the RLA should be the same because both statues create an exclusive
federal remedy. Contra Koehler v. Illinois Gulf Central R.R. Co., 109 Ill. 2d 473, 488 N.E.2d
542, 544-45 (1985) (complexity of RLA's administrative scheme requires stricter preemption
standards than under either the LMRA or the NLRA), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1005 (1986).
267. See supra note 264.
268. 67 Haw. 25, 677 P.2d 449 (1984), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc. v. Puchert, 472 U.S. 1001 (1985).
269. 472 U.S. 1001 (1985).
270. Puchert, 67 Haw. at 29, 677 P.2d at 453.
271. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 472 U.S. at 1001.
272. See Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1054 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
273. In Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 790 F.2d 1341, 1346 (7th Cir. 1986), the
court stated that "there is overwhelming support in the case law for complete preemption in
collective bargaining cases. . . . Where the worker is covered by a collective bargaining contract
and therefore has a potential federal remedy, judicial or arbitrable, the cases hold that the
remedy is exclusive; the worker has no state remedies." It is not logically possible, however,
to harmonize the Graf quotation above with a pertinent quotation from Lueck on section 301
preemption. In Lueck, the Court stated that, "[o]f course, not every dispute concerning
employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-
empted by § 301 or other provisions of the federal labor law." Lueck, 471 U.S. at 211. See
also La Buhn v. Bulkmatic Transport Co., 644 F. Supp. 942, 950-51 (N.D. Il. 1986) (criticizing
Graf approach to preemption, especially as applied to § 301).
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IV. IMPACT
Lingle will have a significant impact upon both Illinois and federal law.
.In Lingle, the Seventh Circuit has in effect overruled an Illinois Supreme
Court precedent without any actual Congressional authority to do so.274 This
is so because, under Lingle, employers can easily avoid the Illinois precedent
of Gonzalez through expedient removal. 275 Once removed, Lingle explicitly
holds that any retaliatory discharge claim must be preempted where the labor
contract contains a just cause provision.276 Further, given Lingle's framing
of the Lueck test, an employer need only show that a clause in the applicable
contract already regulates the conduct giving rise to the employee's state tort
claim in order for section 301 to preempt that claim.277 Indeed, the Lingle
court placed no limit on the individual tort claims that would be preempted
by the existence of a previous agreement on the matter between an employer
and labor union. This result will not only curtail union employee rights in
the state, but also will work to penalize union employees by providing more
complete remedies to their non-union counterparts.278
Lingle's removal and preemption analysis will have a negative impact on
federal labor preemption law as well. The court's confused and muddled
reading of removal law and the complete preemption doctrine will complicate
Illinois federal district courts' required attempts to follow the case. 2 9 Under
Lingle, district courts must first use the Lueck test to determine whether the
case is removable and only then proceed to preemption. These courts will
be required to decide the preemption issue twice: once under the complete
preemption doctrine and again under substantive preemption review.280 This
is not only confusing and unnecessary, it is also inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's recent removal analysis in Caterpillar.21' The result will be certain
confusion within the courts of the Seventh Circuit and possible confusion
in other jurisdictions.
Lingle's substantive preemption analysis creates other difficulties. First,
the court's framing of the Lueck test stands in direct contradiction to
language in the Lueck opinion. The fact that, under Lingle, a contractual
remedy can override a state tort remedy regardless of the nature of the tort
274. Other than in habeas corpus proceedings, only the United States Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to review state court decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
275. If removed as a matter of course, Illinois state courts will be completely precluded from
hearing the cases and Gonzalez may as well be overruled.
276. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1051.
277. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
278. Contractual arbitration remedies are usually limited to reinstatement and back pay while
tort claims can offer punitive as well as other monetary damages. Moreover, an employee who
has truly been discharged for filing a valid workers' compensation claim may not consider
reinstatement to be a remedy at all. See Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1055 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
279. See supra notes 192-216 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 207-16 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 198-210 and accompanying text.
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claim simply cannot be reconciled with Lueck's statement that parties to a
labor contract cannot bargain for what is illegal under state law. 2 Second,
the Lingle test misconceives the analytical basis for section 301 preemption
and its use will confuse labor preemption law as a whole. The entire basis
for preemption under section 301 lies in the need to interpret breach of labor
contract claims under uniform principles of federal contract law.28 3 Lueck
eliminated the ability to simply rephrase a contract claim as a tort and avoid
preemption where the contract remains the basis of the claim or is necessary
for its resolution. 28 4 This is doctrinally sound because the inherent basis for
the claim remains the contract itself. Lueck should not, however, be used
to preempt tort actions than can exist and be resolved without reference to
a labor contract because there is no analytical conflict in such cases between
state tort law and section 301 federal common law. Without such a conflict,
preemption under section 301 would be without doctrinal support and,
therefore, inappropriate regardless of federal policy. 285
Lingle's expansion of Lueck, moreover, is unnecessary in light of another
labor law preemption doctrine-the balance-of-power test. 28 6 The interplay
between these two doctrines provides sufficient protection for federal inter-
ests. For example, it has been suggested that without the Lingle approach,
a state legislature would be free to pass a statute which prohibits the wrongful
discharge of all employees, defines wrongful discharge comprehensively and
provides complete tort remedies and sanctions for statutory violations, thereby
taking the matter off the collective bargaining table entirely. 2 7 Although a
strict reading of Lueck would not preempt the statute, it arguably should
be preempted under the balance-of-power test. 288 The focus of the dispute
should not revolve around whether the hypothetical statute is substantially
dependent upon analysis of a labor contract because the statute would be
completely self-executing. Thus, there could be no conflict with section 301
common law. Instead, preemption in such a case should turn on whether
the statute, by removing a major bargaining tool of employers, would
substantially alter the balance-of-power between labor and management as
established by the federal labor laws.289 Accordingly, it would be preempted
282. See supra notes 244-55 and accompanying text.
283. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 210 (citing Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103-04).
284. See supra notes 224-43 and accompanying text.
285. The issue is not whether the conduct alleged is covered by the contract but, rather,
whether the tort claim alleged requires analysis of the labor contract in order to be resolved.
Only if the labor contract is necessary to the resolution of the claim is there a potential conflict
with the section 301 body of federal contract law. Without this conflict or potential conflict,
there is no basis from which to infer the necessary congressional intent to preempt under the
supremacy clause. See supra note 47.
286. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
287. Memorandum of Respondent on Petition for Certiorari, at 5-6, Lingle v. Norge Div.
of Magic Chef, Inc., No. 87-259 [hereinafter, Memorandum].
288. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
289. Such a statute would remove a major employer bargaining chip from the bargaining
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under the balance-of-power test absent evidence of specific congressional
intent to the contrary.219 Lingle's extension of section 301 preemption would
result in unnecessary confusion with the balance-of-power test: the appro-
priate doctrine to preempt state laws not dependent upon a labor contract
but nevertheless injurious to federal labor policy.
More generally, Lingle will have a negative impact on federal preemption
law because it demonstrates a disregard for the basic aspects of federalism. 29'
The court accorded no weight to the Illinois Supreme Court's characterization
of its state tort law and relegated discussion of Gonzalez to a mere summary
in a footnote.2 92 Although section 301 preemption is a matter of federal law,
the Lingle court should not have created such a jurisdictional conflict without
a thorough discussion of Gonzalez. The conflict, moreover, is particularly
acute because Gonzalez remains binding precedent in Illinois state courts.
291
Finally, Lingle creates a major conflict among the federal circuits and calls
for Supreme Court action to evaluate the decision and clear up the confusion
over Lueck. 294 The Lueck test for section 301 preemption, if properly applied,
strikes a sound balance between the federal interest in uniform labor laws
and use of arbitration, and the countervailing state interest in the protection
of employees through the use of its police power. A narrow reading of the
Lueck test also keeps the scope of section 301 preemption within its logical
limits. The Lueck Court, however, left significant opportunities for the lower
courts to misapply the test. Lower courts have focused on the extremes of
the rationales and policies found in the opinion rather than on the words of
the test. 295
The Lueck Court, in its conclusion, held that section 301 will preempt a
state claim when resolution of the claim is substantially dependent upon
analysis of the terms of a labor contract. 296 These words comprise the Lueck
test and lower courts should concentrate on them as opposed to bits and
pieces from the rest of the opinion. A lower court should begin its analysis
by determining the nature of the state-law claim and then go on to determine
table and alter the balance of power between labor and management to a much greater degree
than the activity preempted in Machinists, 427 U.S. at 135-36. The Machinists Court preempted
a state labor relations board's attempt to stop employees' concerted refusal to work overtime
during contract negotiations. Id. The court found that the state action removed an important
economic weapon from the union's perspective and altered the balance-of-power to such a
degree that a conflict with federal labor law was created. Id. at 154-55. In the hypothetical
situation, the complete removal of the usual presumption of employment-at-will works a much
greater alteration in the parties' bargaining positions than the state board's action in Machinists.
290. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
291. See Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1053-55 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
292. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1036-37.
293. Id. at 1054-55 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
294. See Memorandum, supra note 287, at 2 ("the conflict on the question presented in now
undeniably 'acute').
295. See supra note 11 (extreme examples).
296. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220-21.
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whether the claim is substantially dependent on the contract. 297 The key
words of the analysis, however, -dependent and substantially-are ambig-
uous and require a judicial gloss in order to guarantee a consistent application
in the lower courts.
It is therefore proposed that courts determine whether a state law claim
is substantially dependent upon the terms of a labor contract by applying a
two-part refinement of the Lueck test. Under the refined test, a reviewing
court would first inquire whether the employee's state claim would exist but-
for the existence of the labor contract and, if it would, go on to inquire
whether reference to the labor contract would be necessary in order to resolve
the claim. If either of the inquiries results in a positive answer, the claim
would be substantially dependent upon the labor contract and preempted by
section 301.
The first, but-for, part of the proposed test derives from the word "de-
pendent" in Lueck. For purposes of clarity, dependent can more easily be
defined as completely dependent, rather than the qualified term "substan-
tially dependent. '29 A state-law claim, in order to be completely dependent
on a labor contract, must be unavailable to an employee "but-for" the
contract's provisions. 299 This was the situation in both Lueck"° and Hechler'0
where it provided an obvious case for section 301 preemption-but for the
duties created by the contracts in those cases, the state-law claims could not
have been brought. The but-for inquiry would be consistent with Lucas-
Flour because it would also preempt a parallel breach-of-contract claim
under state law.302 Thus, under the first part of the test, a state claim would
be preempted if it could not exist but-for the labor contract. If the claim
would nevertheless exist absent the contract, the reviewing court must go
one step further in order to satisfy Lueck.
The Lueck test refinement would require another step for those state
claims that pass the but-for analysis because the actual Lueck language is
"substantially dependent" rather than "completely dependent." 303 Stopping
with the but-for step would be too strict and not give section 301 a broad
enough preemptive scope.3° As the second step in the Lueck refinement, a
297. This is, in fact, the basic approach that the Baldracchi court took. See supra note 41.
298. A "but-for" analysis is clear and easy to apply as a first step. It is only logical to
preempt clearly dependent state claims before getting into the vagaries of what constitutes
"substantial" dependence.
299. A state claim would always be completely dependent on the contract where the claim
is based on the breach of a duty provided for in the contract and would not exist otherwise.
See infra notes 300-01.
300. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 215.
301. Hechler, 107 S. Ct. at 2167-68.
302. A state breach-of-contract claim would certainly never exist but for a contract.
303. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 220.
304. For example, a common law wrongful discharge tort claim without a public policy base
would be allowed to stand under a solely "but-for" approach. This is because the duty to not
discharge without just cause is a state duty and would still exist without the contract. The
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court should inquire whether reference to the labor contract is necessary for
the resolution of the state-law claim. If reference to the contract is necessary,
the court should preempt the claim. For example, a general state law tort
claim of wrongful discharge available to all employees under state law would
survive the first prong of the test but not the second. The wrongful discharge
claim would survive the but-for step of the test because such claims are
available to employees regardless of their contractual status. The duty to
not discharge absent just cause would exist regardless of a labor contract. °0
The wrongful discharge claim would, however, be preempted under the
second part of the test because, without a state law definition of wrongful
discharge, reference to the relevant labor cofitract's just-cause provision and
past practice under it would be necessary to resolve the state-law claim.
3 °6
The refined test would not preempt state claims that can be resolved without
reference to the labor contract and that can exist but for a provision of the
contract.
3 07
State workers' compensation discharge claims would not be preempted
under the refined Lueck test. Under the first, but-for, part of the test, the
workers' compensation discharge torts would survive because the claims exist
for all employees regardless of whether they are covered by a labor con-
tract.30 Workers' compensation discharge torts would also survive the second
part of the refined Lueck test because it is not necessary to refer to labor
contracts' just-cause provisions in order to resolve the claims. The issue in
a workers' compensation discharge claim would be whether the employer
fired the employee solely for filing a valid claim, rather than on whether
there were other justifications for the discharge. 3°9 Lingle's result would be
incorrect under the refined Lueck test because the workers' compensation
discharge claim can be brought absent a labor contract, and no reference to
the contract is necessary in order to resolve the claim.
In sum, it is not a new section 301 preemption test that is proposed here,
but merely a refinement of the Supreme Court's Lueck test. Such a clarifi-
cation would preempt truly derivative and dependent state-law claims, and
yet allow union employees to exercise certain minimal rights guaranteed by
the state to all employees. The test, moreover, would be easy to apply and
would guarantee more consistent results in the lower courts. Finally, the test
analysis of the claim, however, would require reference to past practice under any labor contract
with a just cause provision to determine what constitutes just cause. A second step, therefore,
is needed to preempt such derivative state-law claims.
305. See supra note 308.
306. Id. See also Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1987)
(California's tort for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing would also
be preempted under part two of the refined test).
307. Generally, this analysis would allow state claims that further or protect important state
public policies to be brought under state law regardless of whether the claims could have been
grieved under the contract. Accord Note, supra note 19 (in result).
308. Accord Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 814 F.2d 102, 107 (2nd Cir. 1987).
309. Id. at 105-07.
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would not injure the federal policies supporting preemption of some state
laws that would escape preemption under section 301 but that nevertheless
conflicted with federal law. The interplay between the various preemption
doctrines would both protect the federal policies that concerned the Lingle
court and obviate the necessity to extend Lueck beyond its logical limits. 310
V. CONCLUSION
The majority in Lingle took an extreme position on a complex issue
without adequate justification for doing so. The court engaged in needless
repetition by treating section 301 removal and preemption as discrete and
insular doctrines when, in reality, they are only occasionally distinguishable
and always inherently related. The court also unnecessarily expanded Lueck's
preemptive force and eliminated the clear limits placed on the Lueck test by
the Supreme Court itself. The court did acknowledge those limitations, but
could find no instance in which they would be applicable. Finally, the Lingle
court parted ways with the majority of federal circuits, its own district
courts, and the Illinois Supreme Court, without adequately answering their
rationales and offering only an incomplete and occasionally faulty analysis,
all in the name of federal labor policy. The Lueck test represents the Supreme
Court's interpretation of federal labor policy, and the Lingle court did not
have the authority to significantly alter the Lueck test as it did.
VI. POSTSCRIPT
A. The Supreme Court's Decision in Lingle
The Supreme Court handed down its decision in Lingle v. Norge Div. of
Magic Chef, Inc.3" on June 6, 1988. Justice Stevens wrote for a unanimous
Court and reversed the Seventh Circuit. The Court employed an analysis
similar to that outlined in this Note to conclude that section 301 did not
preempt Jonna Lingle's state tort action.
Recounting the origins of and rationale behind section 301 as articulated
in Lucas Flour, the Court first reaffirmed Lueck and the "substantially
dependent" test as a faithful application of the Lucas Flour principles. 1 2
310. See supra notes 282-90 and accompanying text. The balance struck between the refined
Lueck test and the NLRA preemption doctrines would serve the federal policy interests, the
interest in preserving federalism, and employees' interest in obtaining full recovery for their
employer's tortious conduct as well as the employers' interest in limiting their liability for
breaches of contractual duties to bargained for contractual remedies.
311. 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).
312. Id. at 1881. The Court stated:
Thus, Lueck faithfully applied the principle of § 301 preemption developed in Lucas
Flour; if the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective
bargaining agreement, the application of state law (which might lead to inconsistent
results since there could be as many state-law principles as there are states) is pre-
empted and federal labor-law principles-necessarily uniform throughout the na-
tion-must be employed to resolve the dispute.
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The Court then summarized the elements of the Illinois workers' compen-
sation discharge tort as requiring a plaintiff to "set forth sufficient facts
from which it can be inferred that (1) he was discharged or threatened with
discharge and (2) the employer's motive in discharging or threatening to
discharge him was to deter him from exercising his rights under the Act or
to interfere with his exercise of those rights."3 3 Finding each element to
involve an inquiry into the conduct of the employee and the conduct and
motivation of the employer, the Court concluded that neither element re-
quired a court to interpret any term of a collective bargaining agreement. 1 4
The Court concluded that the Illinois tort claim was independent of the
collective bargaining agreement and therefore not preempted under Lueck
because the Court was not required to construe the agreement in order to
resolve the claim."' In so stating the Lueck inquiry, the Court adopted the
equivalent of the second prong of the test proposed by this Note but ignored
use of the first, but-for, prong.3"6
The Court next repudiated the Seventh Circuit's "same issue" test, under
which a state-law claim is preempted if it implicates the same analysis of
the facts as would an inquiry under a provision of the collective bargaining
agreement.31 7 Concluding that such mere parallelism was insufficient to
preempt a state-law claim under section 301, the court reasoned that, al-
though the subject matter covered by the state law might be relevant for
Garmon or balance-of-power preemption purposes, it was irrelevant under
the section 301 preemption doctrine. The Court stated that the sole purpose
313. Id. at 1882 (quoting Horton v. Miller Chemical Co., 776 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir.
1985) (summarizing Illinois state court decisions), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986)).
314. Id. The Court went on to state that, in defending a workers' compensation discharge
claim, an employer must show it had a non-retaliatory reason for the discharge. This also was
found by the Court to be a purely factual inquiry, independent of the collective bargaining
agreement. Id.
315. Id.
316. In a footnote, the Court elaborated as follows:
Petitioner points to the fact that the Illinois right to be free from retaliatory
discharge is non-negotiable and applies to unionized and non-unionized workers
alike. While it may be true that most state laws that are not preempted by § 301
will grant non-negotiable rights that are shared by all state workers, we note that
neither condition ensures nonpre-emption. It is conceivable that a state could grant
a remedy that, although non-negotiable, nonetheless turned on the interpretation
of a collective-bargaining agreement for its application. Such a remedy would be
pre-empted by § 301. Similarly, if a law applied to all state workers but required,
at least in certain circumstances, collective-bargaining agreement interpretation, the
application of the law in those instances would be pre-empted. Conversely, a law
could cover only unionized workers but remain unpre-empted if no collective-
bargaining agreement interpretation was needed to resolve claims brought there-
under.
Id. at 1882 n.7. Thus, the inquiry for the Court was limited to the equivalent of the second
prong of this Note's proposed test. Of this, more will be said.
317. See id. at 1882-83. See also supra notes 171-74, 244-51 (further analyzing the Seventh
Circuit's approach).
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of section 301 preemption is to ensure that federal law will be the basis for
interpreting collective bargaining agreements. 3 8 The Court found that this
purpose was not threatened by the Illinois workers' compensation discharge
tort.
The Court further found that its view of section 301's preemptive scope
did not conflict with the federal policy favoring arbitration in resolving labor
disputes. The Court reasoned that the interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements remained firmly in the arbitral realm after Lingle. If resolution
of the state claim did require interpretation of the agreement, it would be
preempted under Lingle.3 19 The Court, however, did recognize that tangential
references to the collective bargaining agreement might be made in resolving
the state claim without causing preemption. 320 Although a state court would
be required to apply federal common law to these tangential contract issues
under Lincoln Mills,3 2' the issues would nonetheless be taken out of the so
called "arbitral realm."
Finally, the Court found that its view of section 301 preemption was
supported by the fact that certain statutory rights aimed at providing mini-
mum substantive guarantees to individual workers have often been left
unpreempted by the other labor law preemption doctrines.122 As long as
resolution of these rights does not require the interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement, the Court saw no reason why section 301 should be
held to preempt them.3 23
318. Id. at 1883. The Court then rephrased its conclusion as follows:
In other words, even if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-bargaining
agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing
precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without
interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is "independent" of the agreement for
§ 301 purposes.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
319. Id. at 1884.
320. Id. at 1885 n.12. The Court reasoned:
Thus, as a general proposition, a state-law may depend for its resolution upon the
interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement and a separate state law analysis
does not turn on the agreement. . . . As we stated in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
. .. not every dispute . . . tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bar-
gaining agreement is pre-empted by § 301 ....
Id. As an example of such a tangential reference, the Court posited as follows: "A collective-
bargaining agreement may, of course, contain information such as rate of pay and other
economic benefits that might be helpful in determining the damages to which a worker prevailing
in a state law suit is entitled." Id. (citing Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 814
F.2d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1987)(raising the same example)).
321. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
322. 108 S. Ct. at 1884-85.
323. The Court noted that even "[tlhe Court of Appeals 'recognizeld] that § 301 does not
pre-empt state anti-discrimination laws, even though a suit under these laws, like a suit alleging
retaliatory discharge, requires a state court to determine whether just cause existed to justify
the discharge." Id. at 1885 (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc. 823 F.2d 1023,
1046 n.17 (7th Cir. 1987).
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B. Analysis of the Supreme Court's Opinion
1. Section 301 preemption after Lingle
Although the Court's decision in Lingle goes a long way towards resolving
the scope of section 301's preemptive effect, some questions remain.
Unlike the two-prong approach advocated in this Note, the Court stated
that preemption is proper only when resolution of the state claim requires"
the court to construe the collective bargaining agreement.3 4 Thus, the Court
ignored an initial but-for prong which would determine preemption in the
majority of cases, and more simply as well. Of course, this Note anticipates
that the second prong of the proposed test would preempt all of the laws
that would be preempted by the but-for prong. Any law completely dependent
on a collective bargaining agreement would certainly be substantially de-
pendent as well. The reason, however, for a first, but-for, prong is to limit
lower courts' potential disagreement over the distinction between a preempted
reference to a collective bargaining agreement from the nonpreempted "tan-
gential" references discussed in footnote 12 of the Court's opinion.3 2 The
Supreme Court's single-prong approach, on the other hand, allows the
argument over the definition of tangential references to extend to the entire
range of section 301 preemption cases. As seen from the initial disagreement
over the meaning of the term "substantially dependent" in Lueck, leaving
the interpretation of this concept to the lower courts, can lead to widely
disparate results. 26
Moreover, the ambiguity created by the Court's use of a single-prong test
may be a minor problem in contrast to the confusion caused by the expli-
catory language in the opinion. In a footnote, the Court rejected Lingle's
argument that the Illinois workers' compensation discharge claim should not
be preempted because it confers a nonnegotiable right on both unionized
and nonunionized workers alike. 27 The Court first stated that section 301
preemption is not necessarily precluded by the nonnegotiability of a particular
right. This is consistent with the proposed two-prong test. A statute incor-
porating a nonnegotiable right would merely survive the but-for test to reach
the second prong.
The Court, however, neglected to state the inverse proposition, which is
that all negotiable rights are preempted by section 301. Although, this
proposition is arguably unnecessary because a negotiable right could usually
only be discovered by construing the collective bargaining agreement, this
will not necessarily always be true. For example, one can imagine a statute
that provides a right to not be discharged except for just-cause only to
324. See supra notes 314-16 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 298-307 and accompanying text (explaining that rationale for two-
pronged inquiry is mainly to provide clarity).
326. See supra note 11 (listing widely disparate results in lower courts).
327. Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1882 n.7. See also supra note 316 (quoting relevant portion of
footnote).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
employees covered by collective bargaining agreements. Such a right would
be negotiable because, if the parties did not agree to the labor contract, the
right would not exist. Yet, construing the agreement would be completely
unnecessary to the resolution of any claims under the hypothetical statute
as long as "just-cause" was completely defined. The but-for prong of the
proposed test would clearly preempt this statute; the Supreme Court's anal-
ysis, however, leaves significant doubt. 2 '
Finally, the Court did nothing to correct the Seventh Circuit's faulty
application of the complete preemption doctrine. The Court's silence re-
garding the issue encourages the growth of this doctrinal aberration.
2. Balance-of-Power preemption after Lingle
The effect of NLRA balance-of-power preemption on state-law tort claims
and, in particular, workers' compensation discharge claims, remains open
after Lingle. Although Norge, in its brief, referred briefly to Garmon
preemption,3 29 it did not raise balance-of-power preemption except to distin-
guish language in certain balance-of-power cases which had stated that
balance-of-power preemption was not meant to preempt minimum state labor
standards guaranteed to all workers.33 0 Further, the issue largely remains
open in the circuit courts of appeals. Only the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Peabody Galion v. Dollar,33" ' has addressed the issue, rejecting
the use of balance-of-power preemption in workers' compensation discharge
claims .332
Although, as Peabody demonstrated, the case for balance-of-power pre-
emption of workers' compensation discharge claims is weak, use of the
doctrine does remain open in the majority of circuits. Moreover, workers'
compensation discharge claims present a particularly ineffective balance-of-
power preemption argument because workers' compensation is a peculiarly
state regulated right. Therefore, its use against other state tort claims which
do not involve workers' compensation may prove an important preemption
328. These doubts are reinforced by the last sentence of the same footnote. There, the Court
stated as follows: "Conversely, a law could cover only unionized workers but remain unpre-
empted if no collective-bargaining agreement interpretation was needed to resolve claims brought
thereunder." Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1882 n.7.
329. See Brief for Respondent at 16 n.6, Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S.
Ct. 1877 (1988) (No. 87-259). Norge claimed that "[i]t is by no means clear that Lingle's
wrongful discharge claim is outside the protective scope of NLRA Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157,
and hence preempted by that statute." Id. The Board, however, has expressly held that a single
filing of a workers' compensation claim cannot constitute protected concerted activity within
the meaning of § 7. Central Ga. Elec. Membership Corp. 269 N.L.R.B. 635, 635(1984). Norge
neglected to cite Central Georgia.
330. See Brief for Respondent at 34-37.
331. 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981).
332. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
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tool for employers after Lingle.3 3 Thus, balance-of-power preemption should
prove to be a key doctrine in the future development of federal preemption
law. And, as discussed at an earlier point in this Note, use of the balance-
of-power preemption doctrine will, in fact, be crucial in making sure that
the states' expansion of workers' rights does not infringe substantially upon
the NLRA's general approach favoring freedom of contract and volunter-
ism.
334
3. Use of the Federal Arbitration Act to enjoin state-law claims
Finally, even if workers' compensation discharge claims cannot be pre-
empted under either section 301 or the balance-of-power test after Lingle, it
may still be possible to enjoin such a claim brought in state court under the
Federal Arbitration Act.335 That Act generally provides for the enforceability
of agreements to arbitrate controversies arising out of contracts. The Act
specifically applies to any arbitration agreement that is part of either a
maritime transaction or a transaction involving commerce.116 Section 3 of
the Act, moreover, explicitly provides for a stay of any suit or proceeding
brought in any of the courts of the United States which is based on an issue
referable to arbitration. 3 7
An employer and union could, therefore, as part of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, provide that all workers' compensations discharge claims
would be resolved by arbitration and thereby achieve a result somewhat
similar to preemption. The collective bargaining agreement would substan-
tively fall within the scope of the Act because an employer must affect
interstate commerce in order to be covered by the federal labor laws in the
first place.338 The agreement would thus be "a contract evidencing a trans-
action involving commerce" within the meaning of the Act.
Nonetheless, the applicability of the Act to collective bargaining agreements
regulated by the NLRA and the LMRA remains unclear because of conflicting
interpretations of the Act's exclusionary clause. Section 1 of the Act provides
that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees or any other class of workers. '3 9 Whether a
333. See supra notes 286-90, 310 and accompanying text (discussing importance of interplay
between the preemption doctrines, and positing that appropriate use of the doctrines would
adequately protect federal interests). See also supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing balance-of-power preemption generally).
334. See supra notes 287-89 and accompanying text.
335. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-08 (1982).
336. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
337. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). Although the section refers rather ambiguously to "any of the
courts of the United States," the Supreme Court has stated that the provision must apply to
state as well as federal courts in order to make sense. Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 n.3 (1983).
338. See supra note 3.
339. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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collective bargaining agreement constitutes an employment contract is one
issue which engenders much conflict. A minority of federal appellate courts
have held that collective bargaining agreements are not contracts of employ-
ment and, therefore, are not excluded from the operation of the Act.3 40 In
these circuits, NLRA employers could clearly agree to arbitrate workers'
compensation discharge claims. The majority position, however, is that
collective bargaining agreements are contracts of employment and, thus,
potentially excluded from the Act's coverage under section 1. 41
Furthermore, if the majority position is followed, a question arises as to
the types of employment contracts excluded by section 1. Some circuits have
held that section 1 excludes all contracts of employment from the operation
of the Act.3 42 In these circuits, workers' compensation discharge claims would
not be arbitrable if collective bargaining agreements are treated as employ-
ment contracts. Other circuits, however, have held that exclusion is limited
to employment contracts of transportation workers.143 Under this view,
collective bargaining agreements regulated by the NLRA and the LMRA
would not generally be excluded from the Act's coverage while those regu-
lated by the RLA would be excluded. Lingle may very likely bring these
long-time conflicts among the circuits to a head and force the Supreme
Court to resolve them.
To conclude, the Supreme Court's decision in Lingle does much to clear
up the ambiguities of Lueck. After Lingle, preemption of state-law claims
by section 301 should, for the most part, be limited to those claims that are
truly substantially dependent upon the collective bargaining agreement for
their resolution. Questions, however, remain. The interplay between section
301 preemption and balance-of-power preemption has yet to be clarified.
This interplay is critical under the narrow reading of section 301 preemption
340. See Local 205 v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956), aff'd, 353 U.S. 547
(1957); Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters, 217 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1954).
341. See American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 466, 473
(1 th Cir. 1987); San Diego Dist. Council v. Cory, 685 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1982); International
Ass'n of M. & A. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 406 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969); United
Steelworkers v. Galland-Henning Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 323 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 354 U.S. 906 (1957);
Signal-Stat. v. Local 475, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956); United Elec. R. & M. Workers v. Miller
Metal Prods., 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954); Amalgamated Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, 192 F.2d 310 (3rd Cir. 1951); Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers, 187 F.2d 980
(10th Cir. 1951); International Union of United Furniture Workers v. Hardwood Flooring, 168
F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948).
342. See United Elec. R. & M. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954);
United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring, 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948); Gatliff
Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944).
343. See Edwards v. Sea-Land Servs. Inc., 678 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated and rem'd
sub. nom. International Bhd of Teamsters v. Edwards, 462 U.S. 1127, modified on other
grounds, 720 F.2d 857 (1983); Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971); Pietro Scalzitti
Co., Inc. v. International Union, 351 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1965); Signal-Stat. v. Local 475, 235
F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956); Tenney Eng'g v. United R. & M. Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3rd Cir.
1953); Legg, Mason & Co., Inc. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367 (D.D.C. 1972).
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endorsed by this Note, and now adopted by the Supreme Court. Finally,
Lingle will likely bring to a head certain conflicts among the federal circuits
concerning the Federal Arbitration Act. How the Supreme Court eventually
resolves these conflicts could substantially affect the Arbitration Act's use-
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